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What is past has no reality: to me; only the contemporary 
is reality to me. What you live contemporary with,  
is reality: to you. And any human being can thus only 
become contemporary: with the time in which he lives  
— and then with another, with the life of Christ on Earth, 
the holy history stands alone for itself, outside of history.1
  – Søren Kierkegaard
This little book carries with it a simple suspicion: Is the contem-
porary discourse on the contemporary not as metaphysical as  
it is tautological?2 And might the — maybe theological — nature 
of this discourse (that might be emphasized by this prayer of 
Kierkegaard) be the reason for its gleaming, shimmering  
nature, as if the discourse on contemporaneity was the lip-gloss 
of actual theoretical production? And what would be the 
problem if it was theological or metaphysical in the first 
place3 — as art theoreticians and critics for a long time have 
acted as priests4 and the academic worlds have long overcome 
the Derridean realm of deconstruction of the notorious meta-
physics of presence, giving rise to a new “longing for pres-
ence”5 and new ontologies? 
 True, the discourse on the contemporary has captivated 
the artworld with relative ease; it is as comforting as speaking 
to your psychoanalyst constantly about nothing but yourself, 
1. Søren Kierkegaard, Indøvelse i Christendom [Training in Christianity], in Samlede Værker, 
vol. 16 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1962), 70f. Quote translated by Jacob Lund.
2. “Contemporary art deserves its name insofar as it manifests its own contemporaneity.” 
Boris Groys, “Comrades of Time,” in What is Contemporary Art?, ed. Julieta Aranda, Brian 
Kuan Wood and Anton Vidokle (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2010), 23.
3. See the discussion of the theological dimension of presence, in Jürg Berthold, Philip 
Ursprung, Mechtild Widrich, eds., Presence: A Conversation at Cabaret Voltaire, Zurich 
(Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2016), 79.
4. “Some art critics are like priests,” Michael Hampe, in Berthold, Ursprung, Widrich, eds., 
Presence, 81.
5. Acc. Mechtild Widrich, in Presence, 11. “To me, it seems that after the success of the 
Derridean deconstruction of presence in the last decades, there is now again a longing for the 
authentic.” Ibid, 12. See also Thomas Y. Levin’s remark on that issue, in Presence, 103. 
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indulging in your self-contemplation — which is probably the 
reason why there’s rarely anything artworlds currently like 
to speak about more than the actual, contemporary nature 
of contemporaneity itself. If this diagnosis of the comforting, 
maybe consoling nature of a discourse is not proof enough of  
its metaphysical nature, it might be the neighboring method-
ological argument that when writing on contemporaneity, one is 
always writing on and in something at the same moment. One 
is always object and subject at the same time. Writing on the 
object of contemporaneity, I am also a subject of the contempo- 
rary moment in which I happen to write about it. If there is no 
dividing line anymore between object and subject, it seems as if 
the discourse on contemporaneity — and maybe also the entire 
discourse on contemporary art and the contemporary in art  
— is at risk of becoming highly metaphysical, theological, yet 
ontological in nature (all of which will be addressed in this text).
 But proof of this suspicion is not only the comfortable and 
consoling nature of an academic discourse, it is neither the 
ungraspability of the very object of the concept of contempo-
raneity, whose “object is beyond possible experience,”6 nor 
the “slipperiness” of the concept, which has already been the 
topic of academic debate.7 It is also the very utterance of these 
concepts in the everyday life of the artworlds that somehow 
mirrors the same pleasant nature of academic discourse.  
The very word contemporary in itself sounds elegant in its even 
rhythm, sophisticated in its style and progressive in its signif-
icance. Most of the time used as an adjective or attribute to 
designate, describe, or to style something, it is hardly used as 
a noun at all.8 We hardly talk about the contemporary or about 
contemporaneity as such. This might also be the reason why  
it is so hard to pronounce for many: con-tem-po-ra-ne-i-ty  
6. Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art (London/New 
York: Verso, 2013), 22.
7. Philipp Ursprung, in Berthold, Ursprung, Widrich, eds., Presence, 245.
8. Hans Ulrich Obrist, “Manifestos for the Future,” in What is Contemporary Art?, ed. 
Aranda, Wood, Vidokle, 65.
 6. Peter Osborne, Anywhere r  
N t at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art 
(London: Verso, 2013), 22.
 7. Philipp Ursprung, in B r hold, 
U sprung, Wi rich, eds., Presence, 245.
 8. Hans Ulrich Obrist, “Manifestos for 
the Future,” in What is Contemporary Art?, 
ed. Aranda, Wood, Vidokle, 65.
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— an endless word made of infinite syllables that sounds as 
contemplative and mysterious as: so-phis-ti-ca-tion (which to 
many may sound like a synonym).9
 A second reason that may contribute to the sparkle of the 
concept of contemporaneity is more disconcerting — that is the 
global claim of the concept, its totality on a spatial scale, which 
I misunderstood at first. When I was first invited to speak at a 
conference on the contemporary, it was in the context of global 
art history,10 and I wondered why they would let me speak on 
a mere temporal problem, whilst global art history seemed to 
play more on a spatial scale — a totally false assumption, which 
I soon noticed. Also without mentioning Peter Osborne’s now 
famous idea of a “disjunctive unity of present times,”11 that I 
didn’t know well enough then, it has often been said that the 
contemporary is a temporality on the global scale, a brand for 
the globalized art market that is understood anywhere in the 
world. This is also why the contemporary, contrary to the 
neighboring concept of “presence”— the “short supply”12 of 
which has also been subject of academic debate — seems to be 
in no danger of being in short supply, but on the contrary the 
contemporary is abundant, extremely abundant. It is every-
where as contemporary art has invaded everything. “The 
widespread diffusion of the term has placed it in danger of being 
emptied out of of its increasingly complex… meanings.”13 But isn’t 
there, next to the phenomena of either “being emptied out”  
or of a “broadening of presence,”14 — concealed in the sophis-
 9. This contradicts the diagnosis of Boris Groys in his “Comrades of Time,” 22–39, which 
describes the destruction of the culture of contemplation today.
 10. Present’s Disjunctive Unity: Constructing and Deconstructing Histories of Contem-
porary Cultural and Aesthetic Practices, November 26, 2015, Haus der Kulturen der Welt, 
Berlin.  
 11. Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 18.
 12. See the debate of various intellectuals (appearing in this text one after another), in 
Presence, 30.
 13. Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 17.
 14. See Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, in Presence, 197; Juliane Rebentisch, Theorien der 
Gegenwartskunst zur Einführung (Hamburg: Junius, 2013), 11; Ludger Schwarte, “Kritik der 
zeitgenössischen Kunst,” in Notate für eine künftige Kunst (Berlin: Merve, 2016), 67.
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tication of a discourse and in the very emancipatory claim of 
“global contemporaneity”15 — also a risk of a totality in it: that 
the contemporary may serve as the “temporality of globality 
itself ”;16 that the claim of the contemporary serves, in the real 
functioning of artworlds, as a kind of international currency, 
as an American Express Card (or rather a functioning PayPal 
account) of the artworlds?17 This seeming “neutrality,”18 
“simplicity,”19 and “self-evidentiality”20 of the term fits the 
reductive but yet irrefutable definition of the contemporary as 
“whatever is present at the same time.”21 “Art seems to be 
truly contemporary, if it is authentic.”22 In this definition, as well 
as in its (maybe a little far fetched) comparison to the Renais-
sance,23 we already have a full but concealed mythology of the 
contemporary: “According to common-sense understanding, 
defining what we mean by the ‘contemporary’ in art presents 
few problems: anything being produced in the present is always 
contemporary, and by the same token all art must necessarily 
have been contemporary at the time of its production.”24
 This Is So Contemporary
As the sophisticated yet irrefutable nature of the adjective 
“contemporary” is concealed by the noun it describes, it 
reveals itself in its use as such, as a noun — which is also why 
Tino Sehgal’s performance This Is So Contemporary!, first 
performed in the German Pavillion at the Venice Biennale in 
2005, is already the classic work of art (which, as we know, 
 15. Geoff Cox and Jacob Lund, The Contemporary Condition: Introductory Thoughts on 
Contemporaneity and Contemporary Art (Berlin: Sternberg, 2016), 16. 
 16. Ibid., 17.
 17. Osborne compares it to a passport, in Anywhere or Not at All, 27.
 18. Rebentisch, Theorien der Gegenwartskunst zur Einführung, 9f.
 19. Obrist, “Manifestos for the Future,” 59.
 20. Ibid.
 21. See Cox’s and Lund’s opposition to this claim in: The Contemporary Condition, 22. 
See also Obrist, “Manifestos for the Future,” 59.
 22. Groys, “Comrades of Time,” 23.
 23. Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 17.
 24. Ibid.
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is not a work) of the culture of contemporaneity — and which 
is also why it sounds so smooth and odd at the same time. 
Odd as a judgment, yet familiar as an exclamation (for we 
normally expect people to say something like, “This piece of 
contemporary art is really interesting,” an utterance which by 
the way has its genus loci obviously at the Venice Biennale). 
The objectless utterance, “this is so contemporary,” 
somehow reveals the empty yet tautological nature of this 
concept: a judgment without judgment, impossible to specify, 
substantiate or concretize. Ironizing the impossibilty of ever 
being contemporary, the performance also ridiculed the value 
of contemporaneity as a normative proposition. For there 
is no possible criteria for something to be contemporary 
(art) or not, it is an empty attribution almost like something 
sacred, invisible — present for some, absent for others. As 
with something holy, some people see something as being 
contemporary (or the contemporaneity of something), with 
sparkling eyes, which for others is simply nonexistent and 
transparent. This instable visibility of the contemporary 
phenomenon, its flickering nature, that is yet its very definition, 
calls for an epistemology of the contemporary phenomenon 
that clarifies it in the first place, under which circumstances 
it gets visible or not (an epistemology towards which Walter 
Benjamin, in his notes on the dialectical image within the 
Arcades Project, undertook the first steps25). 
 The instable, yet transcendent, or even metaphysical 
nature of a discourse is revealed by the perfectly empty struc-
ture of a statement, a statement without proposition that says 
everything and nothing at the same time, which is performed in 
its original Venice 2005 version by a couple of performers that 
where identical to the trained guards of the exhibition hall; who 
are whispering and murmuring to each other, mirroring the 
 25. Ibid.
 25. Walter Benjamin, The Arcades 
Project (Boston: Harvard University Press, 
2002), 471ff.
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reaction of the visitors: “This is so contemporary,” a purely 
meaningless formula, a perfectly empty judgment, trans-
gressing all judgment, a perfect void, the ideal of the Kantian 
aesthetic judgment: the sublime. 
 One sees at first glance that the discourse on contempora-
neity, supported by Sehgal’s masterpiece on the contemporary 
complex or not, has theological, even metaphysical poten-
tial — and this is why it seems legitimate to enlarge the argu-
ment and speak also about the incorporated metaphysics of 
contemporary art, or of the contemporary in art. It seems as if 
contemporary art, or better the contemporary in art, for many 
people is something religious or at least holy as well, loaded 
with encrypted theological potential, carrying a concealed meta-
physical heritage, impossible to utter and articulate: an empty 
but yet infinite speech act that says everything and nothing at 
the same time, impossible to locate or pinpoint anywhere. 
 The built-in-theology of the discourse on the contempo- 
rary may originate from the first contemporary being,  
the first simultaneous thinkable entity that contained all times 
in itself: God — the one being present at different places at 
the same time who also did not differentiate between object 
and subject. Giorgio Agamben in “What is the Contempo-
rary?”26 — a text produced in 2008, only three years after 
Sehgal’s performance (which Agamben might have seen in 
Venice) — seems to confirm the suspicion of the metaphysical 
nature of the discourse. In this very short and very beautiful 
text (that I will expand on later), Agamben writes about a 
“contemporaneity par excellence,” that would be “messianic 
time,” the “being-contemporary with the messiah,” the “time 
of the now.” In other words (and I will get back to this topic 
later with reference to Kierkegaard, the founder of the modern 
discourse on contemporaneity), contemporaneity, for the 
longest time, has been the contemporaneity of God with Jesus. 
 26. Giorgio Agamben, “What is the Contemporary?” in What is an Apparatus and other 
Essays (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 39 –54.
 . i i  , t i  t  
Contempor ry?” in What is a  Apparatus 
and other Essays (Stanford: Stanfor  
University Press, 2009), 39–54.
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Only because God created a contemporary being, is it possible 
for believers to be or become contemporary with Jesus — and 
for his followers to be contemporary at all.
 To undermine the danger of theological or metaphysical 
discourse — repeating Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s question 
why theological discourse should pose a problem in the first 
place — this book proposes something like an archaeological 
discourse on contemporaneity, an archaeology of contempo-
raneity that tries to avoid the dangers of the metaphysical as 
well as of the historical at the same time (if we forget about 
Nietzsche’s best weapon against metaphysical discourse, which 
of course was history). In doing so, it proposes a shift from a 
singular philosophical interpretation of contemporaneity to its 
subconscious and epistemological meaning (from Osborne back 
to Freud and forward to Foucault), from psycho- to discursive 
analysis and from subjects to societies that use and demand the 
term contemporary. 
 If we thus examine the discursive formation inside of  
which the discourse on contemporaneity emerges, we observe 
that it is itself contemporary to another dominant theme of 
current debates in the artworlds: which is the discourse on 
“new materialisms” and “new ontologies,” which has arisen 
together with “post-internet art.” If I am proposing here an 
archaeology of the contemporary, I will thus hybridize the 
discourses on contemporaneity and new materialisms, trying to 
develop a more material approach to the philosophical debate 
on contemporaneity and temporality.27 
 27. See Knut Ebeling, Wilde Archäologien 1. Theorien der materiellen Kultur von 
Kant bis Kittler (Berlin: Kadmos, 2012); Knut Ebeling, Wilde Archäologien 2. Begriffe der 
Materialität der Zeit von Archiv bis Zerstörung (Berlin: Kadmos, 2016); Knut Ebeling, “The 
Art of Searching: On ‘Wild Archaeologies’ from Kant to Kittler,” in The Nordic Journal of 
Aesthetics, no. 51 (2016): 7–18.
 27. See Knut Ebeling, Wilde Archäolo-
gien 1. Theorien der materiellen Kultur von 
Kant bis Kittler (Berlin: Kadmos, 2012); 
Knut Ebeling, Wilde Archäologien 2. Begriffe 
der Materialität der Z it von Archiv bis 
Zerstörung (Berlin: Kadmos, 2016); Knut 
Ebeling, “Th  Art of Searching: On ‘Wild 
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Journal of Aesthetics, no. 51 (2016): 7–18.
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 The Discursive Formation of Contemporaneity
However, there are not only discursive settings for such a 
discussion but also institutional conditions.28 There are institu-
tions that execute power in the real world as well as in the real 
artworld. Looking at the institutions that somehow amplified 
the discourse on contemporaneity or within which the discourse 
simply takes place, it is obvious that the discourse on contem-
porary art finally invaded the academic field of art. As some 
people still remember, some ten or twenty years ago, there 
were hardly any academic chairs for an art history of the 20th 
century, let alone contemporary art. The contemporaneity of 
any given piece of art was rather a criterion of exclusion, a 
reason not to teach it in academic classes. Joshua Shannon 
describes this radical change as follows: “It is not so long ago 
that dissertations on living artists were all but prohibited, while 
statistics published this year by the College Art Association 
confirm that job searches in contemporary art history now 
outnumber those in any other specialization.… We might wonder 
whether a discipline too long afraid of the present now has 
become besotted with it.”29
 Formerly, the designation “contemporary art” seemed 
too vague to base any academic or historical judgment on, for 
its historical value had not been decided upon yet, which is why 
Pamela M. Lee concluded that “contemporary art history is 
premature because it is always in a perpetual state of becom-
ing”30 — an unimaginable situation compared to today, where 
the situation seems totally inversed. Today, any work of art 
cannot be current enough to consider for academic study; 
rather, the age of an artwork, which always seems too old 
to teach to young students, has become the most prevalent 
criterion of exclusion. In the past, artworks always risked being 
 28. See Hal Foster, “Contemporary Extracts,” in What is Contemporary Art?, ed. 
Aranda, Wood, Vidokle, 142.
 29. Joshua Shannon cited by Hal Foster, ibid., 145.
 30. Pamela M. Lee cited by Hal Foster, ibid.,146. 
 28. See Hal Foster, “Contemporary 
Extracts,” in What i  Contemporary Art?, 
ed. Ar nda, Wood, Vidokle, 142.
 .   it   l 
Foster, ibid., 145.
 30. Pamela M. Lee cited by Hal Foster, 
ibid.,146.
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too recent to be included in academic discourse; today, they 
are always already too old. If in past ages, it was the project 
to update and “contemporize” art history, we now seem to 
historize contemporary art (which is a project in vain, for we 
first have to know what “the contemporary” is in order to 
historize it afterwards).
 This is how radically seemingly stabile temporalities 
can change — and what has changed are the very leading 
signs before time, that tell us how to interpret it in the first 
place. The historical became contemporary in itself, infected 
by the virus of contemporaneity as all of us are. In order to 
understand the radicality of the change, one has to understand, 
that we, in writing the history of contemporary art, are 
ignoring the wisdom of all historians of all ages — who have 
taught us in their first lessons that the present is fundamentally 
unknowable, that an elementary interval needed after presence 
has faded away in order to understand what has happened  
and what is meant by what. And we all know from Baudelaire, 
that presence is an “imperceptively short moment of 
transition.”31
 With this current project of more theorizing than  
historicizing contemporary art or the contemporary in art,  
we finally enter a phase of its academization or institutionaliza-
tion — which calls for some rough periodization of the devel-
opment of the concept of contemporaneity itself.32 It all began 
(although I won’t begin at the beginning, obviously) with an 
overall economization of the contemporary, with the develop-
ment of its own market and fairs for contemporary art. After 
this economization, came its institutionalization in universities 
as well as in art schools, a development that has reached its 
climax already, it seems, with the current effect that art  
school teachers nowadays seem to get scared of the loss of 
“ancient” art history (“ancient” meaning: being older than  
 31. Cited after Gumbrecht, in Berthold, Ursprung, Widrich, eds., Presence, 198.
 32. See also Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 16.
i i l
Ursprung, Widrich, eds., Presence, 198.
 32. See also Osbo ne, Anywhere or  
Not at All, 16.
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the 21st century, for as we know since documenta 12 : 
“modernity is our antiquity”).33 But true, an epoch which was 
able to say “modernity is our antiquity” to us today seems 
as far away as antiquity itself; today, the contemporary is 
maybe not our antiquity, but our classicism, citing all other ages 
with ease. After this economization and institutionalization of 
contemporaneity,34 we reach the phase of the current theo-
retical and philosophical debate on contemporaneity, which can 
be interpreted as the phase of the epistemologization of the 
contemporary, which means that it currently transforms into 
an object of knowledge itself (after having been, for the longest 
time, only the predicate of a certain kind of art) — that can be, 
following Foucault, also an object of an archaeology. 
 But even this current phase of the epistemologization  
of the contemporary can be defined in two different ways: 
either as a classic moment of contemplation, in which we are 
not looking at contemporary art anymore, but we now look  
at the contemporary in art, substantializing contemporary art 
to the contemporary or, even better, to the unpronouncable 
noun contemporaneity.35 This would interpret the discourse  
on contemporaneity as an instance of pure self-reflexivity,  
of Hegelian metaphysics, that tries to stop time from passing 
and elapsing, a Hegelian coming-to-itself of the restless 
contemporary art, questioning this strange and all-too-evident  
self-reflection or substantialization of contemporary art 
becoming the contemporary becoming contemporaneity. What 
is concealed by this seemingly natural movement of coming-
to-itself, of the seemingly self-evident fact, is the question of 
whether it is natural and possible to talk about contempora-
neity? And why and how did it become an object of knowledge 
and discourse in the first place?
 33. See Schwarte, “Kritik der zeitgenössischen Kunst,” 81.
 34. Joshua Shannon cited by Hal Foster, ibid., 145.
 35. Joshua Shannon cited by Hal Foster, ibid., 145.
 33. See Schwarte, “Kritik der  
zeitgenössischen Kunst,” 81.
. See Ameli  Jones on the “institu-
tionalization of prese ce,” in Presence, 139.
 35. See Obrist, “Manifestos for the 
Future,” 65.
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 Secondly, and this book follows this second option, we 
can interpret the discourse on contemporaneity as an emer-
gence of an object of knowledge, that does not only tell us 
something about this object (that we thus should maybe not 
interpret as virtuously as we do), but that inversely also tells 
us something about the culture and episteme that called for it 
and let it appear in the first place. This is why this book does 
not reflect on contemporaneity out of a self-conscious philo-
sophical perspective, articulated by a subject that is not (only) 
the author of its discourses, but tries to develop a broader 
perspective on this discourse, that also integrates material 
aspects of (our own) presence, that often are somehow 
smarter than we are. One has to look at the infrastructure  
of a discourse and describe its formation in the first place.
 Looking at the discourse of the contemporary in art next 
to the discourse on contemporary art, both at first seem almost 
identical or at least inseperably linked (indeed many publications 
follow this route to reflect on the contemporary and on contem-
porary art at the same time). But then they somehow turn  
out to be completely different topics and discourses: Thinking 
about the contemporary in art must not only be thought of as 
self-reflection, as a Hegelian coming-into-itself, but can also  
be thought of as an optical illusion or distortion, with one topic 
slowly emerging behind the other, to the point that one topic 
substitutes the other so that we nowadays do not understand 
anymore how we ever could think about one without the other. 
How could we ever think about contemporary art without 
developing a discourse on the contemporary in art? How 
could we ever dare to say: This is so contemporary! without 
ever properly thinking about contemporaneity? Moreover 
what happens if we look at pieces of contemporary art after 
having developed this discourse on the contemporary in art? 
Or maybe it is even better that the phenomenon of the parallel 
lines of the discourse on contemporaneity and contemporary 
art itself stay seperated from one another even though they 
20
seem at first glance inseparably linked? Is it not a mistake to 
identify the temporality of contemporaneity with contemporary 
art? Should we not cut out the theory of contemporaneity 
totally from the practice of artists producing pieces of “contem-
porary” art? And should we do so, even though seen from 
a distance, the entire discourse on the contemporary in art 
seems to be a spin-off of the success of contemporary art?
 So much for the diagnosis of the current (“contempo-
rary”) moment; the discursive formation in which the discourse 
of contemporaneity emerges today. Furthermore for this 
discursive formation, last but not least, its medial conditions are 
obviously of tremendous importance — it is important to note 
that the contemporary becomes an object of knowledge in the 
exact epistemic moment in which a new medium of contempo-
raneity and simultaneity has emerged and “taken over,” which 
might be responsible for us discussing it. In other words, the 
change in temporality that the discourse on contemporaneity 
addresses, does not only have to do with historical changes 
that we might enumerate and periodize; it also has to do with 
archaeological, subterranean changes in our media environment 
that are much more powerful, that have radically changed our 
temporal perception, that have encoded anew the old analog 
slope ordering past, present, and future: “We no longer have 
a linear time, in the sense of the past being followed by the 
present and then the future. It’s rather the other way around: 
the future happens before the present, time arrives from the 
future.”36 As it has often been said, the internet provides a 
simultaneity of all times and spaces into one temporality, the 
linearity of past, present, and future was nullified and deregu-
lated by the internet, as it radically synchronizes and standard-
izes all planes of time into one medium and technicity. This is 
probably why the internet must be regarded as the historical 
 36. Armen Avanessian and Suhail Malik, “The Time Complex,” in The Time Complex: 
Post-Contemporary, ed. Avanessian and Malik (Miami: Name Publications, 2016), 7.
 36. Armen Avanessian and Suhail  
Malik, “The Time Complex,” in The 
Time mplex: Post-Contemporary, 
ed. Avanessian and Malik (Miami: Name 
Publications, 2016), 7.
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or medial or technical a priori, the “technological condition”37 
of reality for the current discussion of the contemporary. The 
entire discourse on contemporaneity seems to be an effect 
of the internet conditioned by its possible interconnection of 
contemporaries.
 How Long is Now?
Another piece of art celebrating this sublime exhaustion of 
aesthetic judgment is Ceal Floyer’s drop (2013), which was 
presented in one of the very few exhibitions dedicated to the 
question of contemporaneity: “How Long is Now” (2016–17) 
in Kindl-Kunsthalle Berlin. This leads to the question why so 
few curators and institutions up to the present dared to create 
an exhibition of contemporary art on the contemporary itself 
that would approach the complicated question: “How could 
the contemporary as such be shown?”38 In other words, it 
is quite surprising that the massive production of theoretical 
discourse on the contemporary does not correlate with a similar 
production of works of art which could easily be integrated 
and swallowed by the discourse, and which would thwart the 
inflated discourse on the contemporary in art theory. This 
absence on the side of exhibitions has had the effect that both 
phenomena — the elaborated theoretical discourse on the 
contemporary and “contemporary” pieces of art that somehow 
deal with contemporaneity — run in parallel lines alongside  
each other without ever touching, like two asymptotic somnam-
bulants that never step on each others’ feet (which is the effect 
this text eventually tries to produce).
 True, how should the contemporary itself ever be shown 
and displayed in an exhibition if every work of art produced 
today raises the claim of being contemporary? How can 
contemporary artists try to create “contemporary” works 
 37. Erich Hörl, “The Technological Condition,” trans. Anthony Enns, Parrhesia, no. 22 
(2015): 1–15.
 38. Groys, “Comrades of Time,” 23.
Condition,” trans. Anthony Enns, Parrhesia, 
no. 22 (2015): 1–15.
 38. Groys, “Comrades of Time,” 23.
22
of art, on the question of contemporaneity other than by just 
being our contemporaries? And has the epistemological rise of 
the format of the exhibition in itself — which today is no longer 
examined as a passive and neutral container of artworks but 
as an epistemologically active ingredient in the production of 
their meaning — something to do with the rise of contemporary 
art?39 Or is the rise of the “exhibitionary complex”40 just a sign 
of the spectacularization of art and its loss of infinity, surren-
dering itself to “temporary exhibitions rather than [to] spaces 
for permanent collections?”41
 Let us look at Floyer’s drop in the above mentioned 
exhibition, for example: A video image visualizing the passing 
of time — and thus the contemporary moment — by showing 
a simple drop of water at a drain becoming bigger and bigger, 
until gravity pulls it down and it finally drops. The agonizing 
period of waiting for the water drop to finally drop down 
stretches time endlessly, displaying the time (of waiting) itself 
that becomes pure duration. But against the creation of a pure 
and empty moment of contemplation stands the physicality of 
the swelling water drop, swelling more and more like a water 
balloon that becomes bigger and bigger without ever bursting, 
an infinite plethora without end.
 What Floyer’s artwork has in common with Sehgal’s is 
obviously the fact that they are both “time-based” pieces of 
art, as we say nowadays — if not that all art is always, and has 
always been, based in its timely condition (which is something 
different than its historical condition).42 That is to say that they 
not only exist within time, but that they consist of time, that 
 39. See Obrist, “Manifestos for the Future,” 66; Dorothea von Hantelmann and Carolin 
Meister, Die Ausstellung: Politik eines Rituals (Berlin/Zurich: diaphanes, 2010); Tony 
Bennett, The Birth of the Museum (London: Routledge, 1994); and Tony Bennett, “Exhibition, 
Truth, Power: Reconsidering ‘The Exhibitionary Complex’,” in The Documenta 14 Reader 
(Munich/London/New York: Prestel, 2017), 339–353.
 40. Tony Bennett, “The Exhibitionary Complex,” in New Formations, No. 4 (Spring 
1988): 73-102.
 41. Groys, “Comrades of Time,” 27.
 42. Ibid., 32f. 
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they take place in time, in its simple running, elapsing, enduring, 
which is the case for video art (Floyer) as well as for perfor-
mance art (Sehgal).43 Nothing consists more in and of  time 
than the simple and slowly filling of a raindrop with more and 
more water.
 The Post-contemporary
Reading Floyer’s work within the discourse on contemporaneity 
closely, one cannot but recognize one slight shift: the video 
does not show the razorblade moment of the present, that is so 
unnoticeably thin that it is always already over, but its before 
and afterlife. Looking at Floyer’s hallucinative image, the spec-
tator endlessly waits for the raindrop to fall down (which can be 
quite annoying) or recognizes that it has already fallen down. 
The actual moment of dropping and falling down happens too 
quickly for the eye to catch. 
 Eventually, the spectator finds himself either before or 
after the moment of dripping he is anxiously waiting for — for 
when it drips, it is always already over. The eye of the spec-
tator experiences its non-experience: that it cannot grasp the 
present moment, and neither can the human mind. The tempo-
rality of our consciousness, in its most famous philosophical 
descriptions, is always pre- or post-contemporary. The present 
moment withdraws itself as the waterdrop melts away — with 
the consequence that absolute contemporaneity can visibly 
never be seized, it never takes place “here and now,” it never 
happens. We are never contemporary. The drop is — and  
we as its spectators are with it — always either before or after; 
thus contemporaneity is never present to itself, but always 
deferred. 
 The endless deferral of the present moment, the 
deferred structure of presence itself is not only bad news for 
 43. See Widrich on the paradoxical conjunction of performance art and presence in 
Berthold, Ursprung, Widrich, eds. Presence, 10ff; and Jones on the art world’s yearning for 
that, as got last visible in Documenta 14, Presence 113.
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the metaphysics of presence,44 it is probably also the reason 
why — and now I am actually linking the reading of a work of 
art to a theoretical discourse — besides or within the discourse 
on contemporaneity, another discourse has developed, another 
thinking of temporality or criticism of the contemporary, 
which has been simply called post-contemporary 45 (and that 
eventually relates to the discourse on the contemporary 
as post-colonialism did to colonialism, as its succession and 
critique). But the discourse of post-contemporaneity also 
signifies a visible demarcation from the narrow convergence  
of the self-indulging philosophical discourse on contemporaneity 
with contemporary art and integrates arguments from other 
fields instead such as technology and design, sociology and 
economics. In its outspokenness against (philosophical) 
aesthetics and the “experience” and perception of subjects, 
against the ontology of linear chronological time, this discourse 
takes a broader socio-technological perspective, which is quite 
pleasant. 
 If we define the temporal structure of our consciousness  
in Floyer’s piece as being either always before or after,  
pre- or post- the present moment, that can never be grasped 
in itself, there remains the world of things past — the realm of 
post-contemporaneity. The difference between the relation of 
the discourse on the post-contemporary to the discourse on the 
contemporary compares to the relation of post-structuralism 
to structuralism and lies in the fact that the post-contemporary 
does not succeed the discourse on contemporaneity, like 
post-structuralism did not only designate its historical position 
(coming after structuralism) and like post-internet art does not 
signify an art generation historically succeeding the internet 
 44. Nina Zschokke, Presence, 74, distinguishes between three uses of presence: a 
“heightened state of awareness,” “an ordinary, everyday experience of something as present, 
of a thing available for everyday use,” or “the appearance of something unexpected.” See 
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Production of Presence. What Meaning Cannot Convey, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004).
 45. Avanessian and Malik, The Time Complex, 7.
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generation. This means that we are not “post-everything,” 
because something is over, but because something is sailing 
ballast, as Malik explains: 
If we are post-contemporary, or post-modern, post- 
internet, or post-whatever — if we are post-everything  
— it is because historically given semantics don’t quite 
work anymore. So, in a way, the present itself is a  
speculative relationship to a past we have already 
exceeded. If the speculative is a name for the relationship 
to the future, the ‘post’ is a way in which we recognize  
the present itself to be speculative in relationship to  
the past. We are in a future that has surpassed the  
conditions and the terms of the past.46 
Even though I would generally agree with this transgressive 
diagnosis of the post-contemporary, it remains questionable 
whether, firstly, this relationship to the past is called “specu-
lative,” “constructive,” or simply “nostalgic” and, secondly, 
whether the speculative aspect of the attitude towards the 
past, that Heidegger already mentioned, has become so 
because of special historical conditions (e.g. digitality) or if it 
is an ontological structure, as in Heidegger?47 I think that the 
speculative attitude towards the past differs from an archae-
ological perspective in that we can only belatedly reconstruct 
what “the present itself” once was — presence in my view is  
rather a retrospective reconstruction of the past and not  
a speculation towards the future. But there is also the tech-
nological aspect of digitality, of the digital condition. Obviously 
the internet did code or recode the aesthetic practices of an 
entire generation — and as every coding practice means a 
total renewal and destruction of everything there was before, 
 46. Avanessian and Malik, The Time Complex, 7.
 47. Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 23, with reference to Martin Heidegger, Being and 
Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 374, 437.
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there is a new “natural” boundary, a new “before” and a 
new “after”— which is obviously the after of “post-internet.” 
So the “post” of “post-internet” doesn’t mean “after” the 
internet in a temporal sense like in postmodernity or that the 
internet is over, but it means beyond in a spatial sense, beyond 
the line that the internet has drawn.48 We are after, post the 
internet interval, without any possibility to get back to a state 
before it. So the “post” here is more causal than temporal: 
“after” means in effect of the internet’s recoding operations, 
which means that you are always already inside, always 
already affected, assimilated, saturated, soaked. Alterna-
tiveless. As in every coding operation, there is no return to a 
before anymore. It has happened, it has become a fact, a new 
world, if you like.  
 As is the case of post-internet art, the discourse on 
post-contemporaneity emerges with the discourse on contem-
poraneity (just like post-internet art did not succeed art on 
the internet or web-based art but on the contrary came with 
it), not as its succession, but as its secession and criticism. 
The post-contemporary is also a reflection of temporality 
and contemporaneity, but out of a critical, yet deconstructive 
perspective — the main criticism being that the discourse on 
the contemporary has been too much driven by philosophical 
concepts and transcendental ideas of presence that end up in 
a metaphysics of presence that in itself is resurrected in the 
discourse on contemporary art. Repeating my suspicion at 
the beginning of this text, is the question whether the current 
discourse on contemporaneity in philosophy and within the 
artworld may not be a masked resurrection of the metaphysics 
of presence? Another question is: If the contribution of contem-
porary art can be summed up by simply saying, “contemporary 
art can be seen as art that is involved in the reconsideration  
 48. This is also why Obrist called his Munich conference “Ways Beyond the Internet” in 
2012. See http://dld-conference.com/events/ways-beyond-the-internet (accessed April 27, 
2017).
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of the modern projects,”49 then what differentiates the 
“contemporary condition” from the postmodern one, that 
claimed the very same thing?
 Regarding the project of deconstructing any metaphysics 
of presence, Armen Avanessian and Suhail Malik, two of the 
protagonists of the discourse on the post-contemporary, artic-
ulate a general “deprioritization of the present” (more beauti-
fully rendered in the German version by the same authors,  
who talk about an “erosion of the primacy of the present”50): 
“The present as the primary category of human experience…  
loses its priority in favor of what we could call a time 
complex.”51 If the experience of presentness was substituted  
by something else, by something that we don’t understand  
yet, it is no wonder that it is in “short supply”;52 and maybe,  
we really have, in this new situation, to “understand and  
operationalize the present from outside of itself.”53 But what 
does it mean to “understand and operationalize the present 
from outside of itself ”? Outside of what “self”? Obviously, 
as philosophical discourse, the post-contemporary has to 
understand the “self” as subject and as carrier of any idea of 
presence or the contemporary — a “self” within its temporality 
which this discourse tries to exit, trying to develop a position 
towards temporality that is not established from within the 
subject-position, but from its outside, outside the subject and  
its metaphysics, exterior to a subjectivity and subjective 
agency, a renewal of the famous “thought from outside”  
as in Foucault’s phrasing for Blanchot’s project.54
 But if it really is the project of the post-contemporary to 
“understand and operationalize the present from outside of 
 49. Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 23, with reference to Martin Heidegger, Being and 
Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 374, 437.
 50. Avanessian and Malik, The Time Complex, 8.
 51. Ibid., 7.
 52. As is Gumbrecht’s main diagnosis in Presence, 30.
 53. Avanessian and Malik, The Time Complex, 16.
 54. Maurice Blanchot, Michel Foucault, The Thought from Outside and Michel Foucault as 
I imagine Him, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman and Brian Massumi (New York: Zone Books, 1987).
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itself,” like Avanessian and Malik suggest, the question arises 
what this “outside” consists of, if not of subjective agency, far 
from philosophical reasoning and even from “an exteriority to 
experience or an exteriority of thought.”55 In this book — and  
in the larger project it belongs to56 — I try to develop tempo-
rality not as a transcendental category, but as a material one, 
substituting historical for archaeological categories.57 I try not 
to think of it as an a priori category of the mind, but as an  
a posteriori category of its surrounding (its outside) — and to 
think temporal or temporalizing techniques and media (begin-
ning with the most simple ones like the clock) in reverse in a 
time critical analysis as a priori categories of knowledge, as 
Foucault’s “positive unconscious of knowledge,” collaborating 
in the formation of human temporality in the first place.58 Not 
to look at the problem of temporality via the human mind and 
its undoubtedly setting conditions for a temporal understanding 
of the world means a complete methodological reverse, that 
demands to look at the human temporal mind as being always 
already conditioned by empirical techniques and media as  
simple as the watch. What are the empirical conditions for 
contemporaneity? What are the techniques and media respon-
sible for the formation of an entire discourse on temporality  
and contemporaneity?59
 The Media of Contemporaneity
There emerges an entire history of knowledge in front 
of our eyes: a materiality not only of the mental product 
named “time,” but of the production of time by technological 
media — a materiality of time and of temporality: “Regimes 
 55. Avanessian and Malik, The Time Complex, 16.
 56. Ebeling, Wilde Archäologien 1; Ebeling, Wilde Archäologien 2; Ebeling, “The Art of 
Searching,” 7–18.
 57. Cox and Lund, The Contemporary Condition, 27.
 58. Ibid., 29f.
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of time structure, homogenize, mechanize and control time. 
The modern regime of time defines the public and continuity 
of the time that counts. The link of number and movement 
is achieved by cosmologies, calendars, regimes of time, 
all sorts of physical-technical apparatuses, but also micro-
architectures and bodily techniques.”60 Thus temporal concepts 
like contemporaneity are not as immaterial as philosophy 
or theology like to think. Time is not just in our minds as 
a transcendental idea, time and modern temporality were 
also produced in the empirical and mechanical world, they 
were historical productions of the nineteenth century with its 
technical synchronization and standardization of time,61 the 
empirical invention of clocks and watches, the technicity of 
all phenomena of isochrony and synchrony.62 Another media 
history to be told, that also altered our understanding of the 
present moment forever, is the one of the establishment 
of “live” broadcasting that created contemporary publics 
(in Berlin for the first time in 1936). The media history 
of the production of the live phenomenon and the massive 
production of synchronicity and simultaneousness via the 
technical medium of television broadcasting tells us that 
“time” as such was not only a production of the nineteenth 
century; and inversely that the idea of the “present” moment 
was a product of the twentieth century. Whereas “time” 
and therefore the possibility of synchronicity was invented 
in the nineteenth century, the idea of the present moment, 
Benjamin’s Jetztzeit — the time of the now– was invented in 
the twentieth.63
 60. Schwarte, “Kritik der zeitgenössischen Kunst,” 77.
 61. Wolfgang Schievelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and 
Space (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979/1986).
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 As one sees, there are also technical conditions under-
lying the establishment of the contemporary in the nineteenth 
century. Looking at the media history of time, at the huge 
differences between computational, material, and human 
temporalities with its “techno-material understanding”64 of 
temporality, we realize that there remain entire media histories 
of contemporaneity to be told and entire discourse analyses 
to be done, telling us what contemporaneity meant in what 
historical epoch, how these meanings changed and under what 
historical and technical circumstances the discourse of the 
contemporary developed. This research on the very media 
history of the materiality of time — that has nothing to do 
with the materiality of language65 — may seem not only as a 
renewal, but as an empirical repetition of the “thought from 
outside;” a repetition that is much more precise on the question 
of what this numinous position of exteriority consists of and 
what it demands. It is also very interesting in this context  
that Avanessian and Malik suggest a technical repetition of  
the philosophical discourse of deconstruction of the metaphysics 
of presence — that overestimates the deconstructive power  
of technology and the economy, which may destruct, but not 
yet deconstruct any metaphysics of presence (if they do not 
rely on it themselves).66 
 Another good example of an artistic repetition of the 
“pensée du dehors” is Floyer’s artwork mentioned above:  
drop does not describe temporality from a subjective angle, 
from a “pensée du dedans,” it is not dealing with a subject or 
mind apprehending or understanding or constructing mental 
“presence.” It is much simpler. It constructs presence via  
an object, a drop of water — and thus via a spectator, that is 
anxiously waiting for the drop to finally drip down. But does 
this strategy really already reach an “outside” of subjec-
 64. Cox and Lund, The Contemporary Condition, 18, 20.
 65. Avanessian and Malik, The Time Complex, 48.
 66. Ibid., 50.
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tive agency? Is the subject not included in the picture via this 
spectator, that is constructing the tension in the scenario? Is 
subjective agency not always already there, without which time 
would be as flat as waterdrops dripping all over the world all 
the time, without anyone noticing or acknowledging it? Is it not 
human temporality and thus subjectivity that is displayed by 
Floyer here?
 Of course. But there is also the material aspect of the 
raindrop, its simply being-there, that inversely has produced 
the spectator in the first place, that may not have come into  
the world without a material world of things like raindrops  
— their shiny and slow plethora, filling with water, the wonder 
of a bubble growing bigger and bigger, reminding us of our 
being-in-a bubble that grows bigger and bigger.67 Talking about 
the archaeology or prehistory of the subject in a bubble, we 
should keep in mind that the bubble can help us “understand 
the present age from outside of itself,” as Avanessian and 
Malik have suggested. For this perspective on human subjec-
tivity “from outside of itself” is precisely the perspective of  
the bubble, that does not only show moments of before or  
after the fall of the drop, of pre and post absolute contempora-
neity; it also shows human subjectivity as being in a bubble,  
in a prehistorical phase of when it originated without having 
really begun. This deferral between origin and beginning  
— the embryonic time of us being in a bubble — is exactly the 
“erosion of the primacy of the present,”68 that Avanessian  
and Malik talk about, for the being-in-the-bubble is not yet 
present in the world, has not yet presented itself to the world, 
not having become contemporary yet. 
 The Discipline of Contemporaneity
Having the image of the deferred bubble — with or without a 
 67. For a philosophical reading of man in the bubble see Peter Sloterdijk, Bubbles: 
Spheres Vol. 1. Microspherology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011).
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contemporary or non-contemporary being in it — in mind and 
before the eye, one could wonder about a discipline, a tempo-
rality or at least a methodology to approach it. If we can never 
seize the present moment, if we always seem either before 
or after true contemporaneity, if the contemporary being lives 
“from ‘not yet’ until ‘not anymore,’”69  if we thus either come 
too early or too late to see the moment of the drop fall down 
and if the contemporary thus “is a nostalgic remembering of  
a situation that might or might not have happened”70 and 
“being contemporary means to return to a present we have 
never been to,”71 then, if this is the case, which is or would  
be the proper discipline to approach it? What is the discipline  
or the institution of contemporaneity (if it is not the institution  
of contemporary art)? What is the capacity we need to  
qualify true contemporaneity? And what would be an appro-
priate methodology or epistemology needed to represent the 
contemporary moment, for it seems clear to this point that all 
methodological problems come back to the problem of a fair 
representation of contemporaneity?72 Should contemporary  
art simply represent or “convey”73 or act as agent of  
contemporaneity? 
 These are true, old questions that have not arisen with 
the newly awakened discourse on contemporaneity. Kierke-
gaard and Nietzsche already asked them in the nineteenth 
century — when the sketched technical synchronization of 
time unfolded — under the sign of “the contemporary disciple” 
(Kierkegaard) or the more famous “untimely” (Nietzsche). 
After these authors Agamben summed up his archaeological 
 69. Maurice Blanchot, “Du ‘ne pas encore’ au ‘ne plus’,” in Après Coup (Paris, 1983), 
86.
 70. Widrich, Presence, 31.
 71. Obrist, “Manifestos for the Future,” 68.
 72. Here I disagree with Cox and Lund in that an archaeology would not be dealing with 
a representation of contemporaneity — there is no representation in archaeology —, and 
therefore it would not be “focusing on how contemporaneity… is represented” (Cox and Lund, 
The Contemporary Condition, 33) but with its conditions and codifications. 
 73. Schwarte, “Kritik der zeitgenössischen Kunst,” 69.
encore’ au ‘ne plus,’” in Après Coup  
(Paris, 1983), 86.
0 Widrich, Presence, 31.
1 Ob ist, “Manif stos for the  
Future,” 68.
 72. Here I disagre  with Cox and  
Lund in that an chaeology would no  
be dealing with a representation of  
cont mporaneity — there is no representa-
tion in archaeology — and therefore it  
would not be “focusing on how contempora-
neity… is represented,” (Cox and Lund,  
The Contemp rary Condition, 33) but  
with its conditions and codifications.
 73. Schwart , “Kritik der zeitgenös-
sischen Kunst,” 69.
33
approach in an interview in 2015 with the German weekly  
Die Zeit :
What I call a vital relationship to the past interests me  
only insofar as just it allows an access to the present [...…]  
We will never grasp our present, it will always with-
draw itself from us. This is why contemporaneity is the 
most difficult task, because truly contemporary is — as 
Nietzsche already knew — the untimely [...] This is why 
I am convinced that only archaeology allows an access 
to the present, for it retraces its course and its shadow, 
which the present casts on the past.74
Why is true contemporaneity “the most difficult task,” at least 
for Nietzsche and Agamben? Do we not currently witness 
a fruitful intellectual discourse on contemporaneity? Is it not 
answering the problem of contemporaneity? Looking at this 
blossoming discourse, one immediately recognizes that it is 
not answering the problem of a discipline or institution of the 
contemporary, but that it actually poses it properly. As we 
read statements by philosophers and art historians as well 
as by theoreticians of art of all kinds, one might ask if it is a 
philosophical or a historical discourse? Who is the carrier or 
institution of the discourse on the contemporary? And who is to 
institute the present moment? Who seizes the contemporary 
moment of the bubble about to fall (or of its endless deferral)?
 Two disciplines, which are generally held to be the 
institutions of any judgment of contemporaneity, immediately 
come up, namely history and philosophy; and consequently, 
the discourse on contemporaneity is mostly dominated by 
philosophers and (art) historians that are held responsible for 
the question of instituting the contemporary. And interestingly 
 74. My translation from: Giorgio Agamben, “Europa muss kollabieren,” in Die Zeit, 
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http://www.zeit.de/2015/35/giorgio 
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enough, it is with these two disciplines, history and philosophy, 
that Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Agamben — along with 
Benjamin and Foucault — struggled most. We will not get into 
the details of their complex methodologies at this point, but just 
note for the moment that these are the thinkers that (probably) 
most intensively asked themselves about contemporaneity, 
that struggled most with developing a position that could be 
accounted for as being truly contemporary — and that are 
consequently the positions mostly cited when it comes to 
developing “contemporary” philosophical, aesthetical, or art 
theoretical attitudes. For the moment being, we just note that 
they all had a problem both with philosophy and with history. 
What were they? What would be the problems of both history 
and philosophy when it comes to thinking or instituting the 
contemporary?
 Let’s begin with philosophy, for the discourse on contem-
poraneity seems to be dominated by this discipline. What is 
the problem with the philosophical discourse on contempora-
neity — besides the fear that with this substantialization of 
naming the present moment “contemporary” and initiating 
an entire discourse after it, one would be always already 
trapped in a philosophical discourse that could only but solidify 
and stabilize entities that are unsolid and unstable by nature. 
Without even trying to summarize the great tradition of 
modern suspicion towards philosophy that runs at least from 
Nietzsche to Foucault and from Benjamin to Blanchot, one can 
simply say that philosophy almost always idealizes what it talks 
about. Philosophy, in most cases, is not in contact with what it 
talks about — not even in its language, not even literally. By its 
simple means of discourse production: its phrasing and naming, 
it generates an object which may not be one. When talking 
about contemporaneity, it develops grand concepts and many 
arguments for this or that — but it does not really touch tempo-
rality at any time. For example, one of the key protagonists of 
the philosophical debate on contemporaneity, Peter Osborne, 
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idealizes greatly when he substantializes contemporaneity as 
“present’s disjunctive unity”75 — a problematic philosophical 
(or dialectical) tendency, which might allow certain questions.  
Is contemporaneity — to stay in Osborne’s Kantian discourse  
— a transcendental a priori or is it a judgment a posteriori? 
What unity are we talking about and why is a globally decom-
posed presence a “unity” at all?76 Isn’t it a classical dialectical 
movement, to first state the temporal and spatial dispersion 
of contemporaneity in globality, but to finally recollect it with 
the establishment of a forceful concept of contemporaneity? 
Doesn’t this concept in its problematic “unity” (even though 
thought as fictitious) violate the fundamental heterochronous 
and disseminated nature of anything contemporary on a global 
scale? And does contemporary art, that intensifies this dissemi-
nation, really produce this fictive unity? 
 For the Kantian tradition, the case seems clear, as for 
Kant the contemporary can never be a judgment, for it is 
something transcendental that precedes any judgment. But how 
are we to deal then with Sehgal’s “This is so contemporary!,” 
which joyfully plays with the contemporary being an empirical 
judgment (and ironically ironizes the impossibility of being truly 
contemporary)? And would it not be funny to imagine Kant 
exclaiming himself: “This is so contemporary?” It seems to 
be Osborne’s commitment to develop the contemporary as 
a transcendental concept and regulative idea — even though 
he has tried to develop the contemporary as a fiction, like 
any unity,77 which I think it is not — the contemporary is 
neither fictitious nor a unity. As a transcendental idea, the 
contemporary (and with it, its references to the modern and 
 75. See Osborne, “Temporalization as Transcendental Aesthetics: Avant-Garde, Modern, 
Contemporary,” in The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics, no. 44–45 (2012–13): 28–49; Osborne, 
“The Fiction of The Contemporary: Speculative Collectivity and Transnationality in the Atlas 
Group,” in Aesthetics and Contemporary Art, ed. Armen Avanessian and Luke Skrebowski 
(Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2011), 101–124. 
 76. See Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 22.
 77. See Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 23f; “The Fiction of The Contemporary,” 10.
 75. See Osborne, “Temporalization  
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Gard , Modern, Contemp ary,” in Nordic 
Journal of Aesthetics, no. 44–45 (2012–13): 
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the avantgarde) is emptied out of all its historical and material 
references.
 The critical tradition from Nietzsche to Foucault to 
Agamben criticized exactly this tendency in philosophy to 
neglect the historical and to empty out what it is talking about 
in its transcendental discourse, to transform the contemporary 
into a purely metaphysical question, to have a plain metaphysics 
of contemporaneity. But how can one touch temporality in 
language, as a philosopher or an author? Nietzsche literally 
touched time in his atheological ecstacy of Silvaplana, devel-
oping the grand idea of Eternal Recurrence;78 so did Proust, 
obviously, and many many others. And every archaeologist 
does,— if archaeology is the discipline born out of the desire  
to touch time,— to touch temporality. Of course, one can tear  
the present moment apart and deconstruct its unity by showing 
the cracks of the “untimely” and the treasures of the archae-
ological. It is archaeology’s task to dig out and unveil these 
ruptures and discontinuities and atemporalities that are conven-
tionally hidden by historical time. It is also a political task to 
dig out the hidden, the covered, lost and unlived moments in 
history, the untimely and atemporal moments that can shed 
new light on our present moment — which for Agamben, at 
the moment of the European crisis, were the practices of the 
monks that were stepping outside.79
 But the most important point remains, that there simply 
is no metaphysical “now” in archaeology, or as the object of 
archaeology, as the present is constitutively excluded from 
this discipline, which is by definition always searching for the 
remnants of past times and not of the contemporary pres-
ence — for which one doesn’t need any archaeology, which 
begins only where human evidence and documents end. Pres-
ence in archaeology is only the time of searching, digging and 
 78. Groys, “Comrades of Time,” 31.
 79. Agamben, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life, trans. Adam 
Kotsko (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).M nastic Rules and Form-of-Life, trans. 
Adam Kotsko (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2013).
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excavating, the time of “lowering the plumb,” as Foucault’s 
genealogist famously said. It consists of  an alternative tempo-
rality that has become increasingly important in postprocessual 
archaeology as well,80 whose most important object of excava-
tion has become the excavator, the long process of excavation 
itself, the digging subjects with their ups and downs, doubts 
and faults — which is why this archaeology without objects may 
be solidary with the discourse on contemporaneity, which is 
as ungraspable as such an archaeology without archaeological 
objects.
 The History of Contemporaneity
Before we will treat the question whether there are other 
possible and thinkable concepts of the contemporary within 
philosophy, we will ask more about another discipline dealing 
with it, history. For history, within the “crisis of historical 
agency,”81 also has difficulty in dealing with contemporaneity 
for two simple methodological reasons that are linked to each 
other. At first sight, any presence seems to be the opposite of 
the historical; it is still too close to be grasped and seized by 
history, which always comes later, afterwards, when the day 
of contemporaneity has ended and Hegel’s owl Minerva starts 
its flight. History cannot see the present day, it cannot see 
contemporaneity, it can only see the negative, the night, the 
written document. The medium of history being the document, 
which is, according to Foucault’s definition, transparent, will 
only grasp what once has been written about past presences 
and historical contemporaneities. There is nothing written 
historically on the present moment yet, it looks right through 
it. As presence is transparent, the contemporary moment 
remains, according to Agamben, dark.82 
 80. See Ian Hodder, ed. ,Archaeological Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity 2001).
 81. Cox and Lund, The Contemporary Condition, 14.
 82. Agamben, “What is the Contemporary?” 44ff.
 80. See Ian Hodder, ed., Archaeological 
Theory Today (Cambridg : Polity, 2001).
Condition, 14.
 82. Agamben, “What is the Contempo-
rary?,” 44ff.
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 Moreover what does history hold for the contemporary, 
what does news media tell us about our time, which is restored 
and renewed every second today, and that helps to create 
conditions of perfect contemporaneity to finally catch the 
contemporary moment: mostly blurry, an ideal image, an ideal-
ization of a time, that never even touches… anything (for docu-
ments, digital or analog, dematerialize what they treat). So if 
we really want to find out what is or what was contemporary at 
a certain time, we urgently need to switch from historical and 
transcendental models of causal time to alternative methodolo-
gies and material models of temporality.
 But this raises an immediate objection. Are we not 
constantly writing on the present moment, today more than 
ever? Never has there been so much published on the present 
moment than in the digital age of social networks, such as in 
the case of “tweeting” and instant messaging. The digital is 
obsessed with the present moment, its subjects telling everyone 
constantly where they are, and what happens to them right 
now. One could argue, that with the digital revolution, the 
gap between presence and history has become smaller, for 
everything is published instantly, simultaneously, which is also 
why many people fear the neverending presence and simulta-
neity of the internet. True. But is it contemporary? Is, or was, 
true contemporaneity not the very opposite of this collective 
hysteria? Or has Foucault’s “history of the present moment” 
finally become reality?
 Obviously not. On the contrary, it seems as if the digital 
revolution has created a crisis of contemporaneity, or a 
contemporaneity that is in a constant phase of crisis, because 
the internet has taken the interval away, in which history 
was working in the first place, the deferral in which historical 
consciousness was established at all. One can easily guess that 
most of what is published in or on the present moment today 
in most cases will never enter the realm of history. Simply 
because history is, like writing, about a fundamental deferral, 
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in which historical consciousness chooses which story it tells 
us and which remains untold; because history will always 
only present us a selection, a little fraction of what once was 
contemporary — a selection without criteria that is far from 
a faithful representation of the contemporaneity or any past 
present moment. So even though history (and art history 
especially) is claiming to have an access — the only access —  
to past contemporaneities and to represent past presences,  
it cannot and never could. History has always only interpreted 
the past, but it is more important to literally touch and  
grasp it.83 
 The absence of any material access to the past is also the 
reason why philosophical aesthetics, along with (art) history, 
will always misunderstand the contemporary and develop a 
misleading transcendental discourse that loses touch with its 
very objects — if it identifies them at all. The trouble — that 
Agamben touches later with his conception of “origin” — is  
the problem of history itself, in that it always already has to 
have recognized what it wants to write its history about in 
order to do so. Yet the contemporaneity of the contemporary 
on the contrary lies in phenomena, which have not yet been 
recognized as such. This is why history, by its very definition, 
is blind to any contemporary phenomenon, if it is truly contem-
porary. In other words, history has a hard time identifying 
new objects, new beginnings, and new origins, that have not 
yet identified themselves as belonging to this or that sphere. 
It will always misunderstand (or simply not see) phenomena 
that change their DNA radically as if they belonged to another 
species; which was the case with DIS-magazine, which was 
only publicly discovered as belonging to the sphere of contem-
porary art when the collective were named curators of the  
9th Berlin Biennale.
 
 83. See Knut Ebeling, Wilde Archäologien 1. Theorien der materiellen Kultur von Kant bis 
Kittler (Berlin: Kadmos, 2012).
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 This exhibition was in itself able to make the dilemma of 
art history (together with philosophical aesthetics) quite clear. 
If contemporary art is only truly contemporary when it tries 
not to be “art” or “artistic” anymore — which was obviously 
the case with this Biennial that in most venues looked more like 
a pop-up store than an art institution — it will not be recog-
nized, nor even seen by art history and philosophical aesthetics 
(confirmed by the very controversial reviews). In other words, 
the entire discourse of philosophical aesthetics on the contem-
porary, dealing only with objects which have previously been 
identified and which are therefore not contemporary anymore, 
is not able to see the contemporary and risks to completely 
self-absorb itself. If one reads the imaginary history of contem-
porary art in this way simply as a substitution or prolongation of 
modern art or of the notorious “critical project of modernity,” 
one ends up with random periodizations and a random history 
of random objects84 — that culminates in the problematic claim 
to establish a normative system of contemporary art as if one 
were Hegel himself.85 The very problem of this conception 
lies not only, as Nietzsche saw already, in its self-confident 
assumption of a historical consciousness, of a subject of history, 
that drags itself more and more painstakingless to first post-
modern,86 then posthistorical, now contemporanean interpre-
tations of itself — the self-image of a historical consciousness 
that got replaced today by Facebook’s timeline. It lies also in 
the establishment of a normative system of contemporaneity, 
that allows the use of the “contemporary-claim” as normative 
proposition, resulting in an art critique that can use it as denun-
ciation, by simply saying: This is not contemporary!
 84. See Raqs Media Collective on the relativity of periodization of the contemporary, 
in “Now and Elsewhere,” in What is Contemporary Art? e-flux journal (Berlin: Sternberg 
2010), 46.
 85. See Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 17; Rebentisch, Theorien der Gegenwart-
skunst zur Einführung, 23.
 86. See Osborne on the “fortunate” end of postmodernity, in Anywhere or Not at All, 17.
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41
 The Theology of Contemporaneity
If contemporaneity can be found in the chaotic moment of 
the unchosen, the uncensored and the anarchic multitude of 
presence more than in written documents, it might only be 
grasped by a god — and not by the almighty internet. Talking 
about the gods, there is a third discipline of contemporaneity, 
which is theology. For again, the first contemporary was God, 
which is only why we can be contemporaries of Jesus — and 
which is also why Agamben can write that the “contemporari-
ness par excellence is messianic time, the being-contemporary 
with the Messiah, which he calls precisely the ‘time of the 
now.’”87 Contemporaneity in the first place was the contem-
poraneity of God with Jesus; just because God created a 
contemporary creature (that was Jesus), it was thus possible 
for the believers to become contemporary to Jesus also. This 
is the strange ambiguity of contemporaneity in Kierkegaard’s 
thinking, who struggled like no other with this very paradox 
at the heart of Christian theology. Kierkegaard, who also 
according to Groys first “famously asked what it would mean 
to be contemporary of Christ,”88 thus was the most prominent 
of those believers desiring and struggling to become contem-
porary with Jesus, and maybe he was the first modern thinker 
of the contemporary, whose struggle for contemporaneity is 
impressive, if not comical or even hysterical.
 But we also have to be very aware of the fact that we are 
here dealing neither only with the problem of a singular, maybe 
hysterical philosopher, nor just with theological problems as 
such. We are also touching the ambivalent process of the 
secularization of the subject and its temporality, which is why 
we also have to be aware of the fact that the philosophical and 
theological foundations for thinking the contemporary were 
laid in the same epoch in which the technical synchronization 
of time happened — when “time” as such was invented 
 87.Agamben, “What is the Contemporary?” 52.
 88. Groys, “Comrades of Time,” 26.
 Agamben, “ hat is the Contempo-
rary?,” 5 2.
 88. Groys, “Comrades of Time,” 26.
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in the first place. Defining contemporaneity was in idealist 
nineteenth-century thinking equal to the construction of a 
secular, bureaucratized subject — Kittler’s “subject as public 
servant”89 — with a standardized time that somehow marked 
at the same time the disappearance of God. For when different 
places were all synchronized by the same standard time, 
there was no more need for the total synchronization named 
God. If we once invented a monotheistic God for a lack of 
contemporaneity and synchronicity, we no longer need this 
figure anymore for everything has been synchronized and is 
seemlingly contemporary on the internet.
 Still, for post-idealist Kierkegaard, as for much of the 
nineteenth century, the problem of contemporaneity was not 
yet the problem of the technical synchronization of time,  
as told by Wolfgang Schievelbusch’s The Railway Journey,  
which nevertheless deals with the same epoch.90 It was still 
identical with the theological problem of the man-born God. 
This question for Kierkegaard arises — as for an entire 
theology — as the “question of a historical point of departure,” 
as the paradox to establish an “historical point of departure  
for an eternal consciousness.91 
 This paradox lies in the idea that an unbosomed figure 
cannot be man-born. If God became historical in the figure 
if Jesus, he cannot remain divine at the same time. Is Jesus 
human and historical or is he divine and godly? Is he physical  
or metaphysical? Could Jesus ever be a historical figure if 
he was a divine revelation? And if he was a historical figure, 
have there ever been contemporaries of his that could witness 
his being of flesh and bones? Were his disciples Jesus’s 
contemporaries or not? These are the framing questions for 
 89. Friedrich Kittler, “Das Subjekt als Beamter,” in Die Frage nach dem Subjekt, ed. 
Manfred Frank, Gérard Raulet, and Willem van Reijen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), 
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Kierkegaard’s 1844 text “The Case of the Contemporary 
Disciple” in his Philosophical Fragments, which deconstructs 
literally any possibility of historical eyewitnessing. The contem-
porary here is the contemporary disciple — who should know 
his divine quality better than anybody else. But the closer  
the contemporary gets to the mystery of the unbosomed man,  
the more the possibility of eyewittnessing dissolves before  
his eyes:
It is easy enough for the contemporary learner to acquire 
detailed historical information. But let us not forget  
that in regard to the birth of the god (Christ) he will 
be in the very same situation as the follower at second 
hand, and if we insist upon absolutely exact historical 
knowledge, only one human being would be completely 
informed, namely, the woman by whom he let himself 
be born. Consequently, it’s easy for the contemporary 
learner to become a historical eyewitness, but the 
trouble is that knowing a historical fact — indeed knowing 
all the historical facts with the trustworthiness of an 
eyewitness — by no means makes the witness a follower, 
which is understandable, because such knowledge means 
nothing more to him than the historical. It is at once 
apparent here that the historical in the more concrete 
sense is inconsequential; we can let ignorance step in  
here, let ignorance, so to speak, destroy one fact after  
the other, let it historically demolish the historical.92 
In other words, Kierkegaard arranges a test that consists in  
a comparison of Jesus’s contemporaries with his later 
believers. But this test has not the expected result of historical 
reason, which would tell us that the contemporary has an 
 92. Søren Kierkegaard, “The Case of the Contemporary Disciple,” in Philosophical 
Fragments: Kierkegaard’s Writings Vol. 7 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 
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advantage over the later ones. No matter how close one 
gets to Jesus, no matter how contemporary one is or was 
to Christ, one will never know more than the succeeding 
men. Contemporaneity does not tell us anything about the 
contemporary moment; there is no eyewitness that could  
help us solve the paradox of the contemporary disciple.
 As such questions for Kierkegaard always tend to turn 
into an existential endeavor, he draws rather radical conse-
quences out of this failure of historical contemporaneity.  
He develops the project of “historically demolishing the  
historical,”93 that sets the scenery for asking the question of 
contemporaneity in the twentieth century. What is the value  
of contemporaneity, if the contemporary does not provide  
more substantial information than later sources? If he is not  
any wiser than the successors? But if the contemporary has  
no more intimate knowledge than the non-contemporaries,  
is Kierkegaard’s project of “historically demolishing the histor-
ical” not deconstructing our belief in the value of contempo-
raneity as such? How does this deconstruction relate to the 
deconstruction of the discourse on post-contemporaneity?  
And do they have anything to do with the suspicion of the  
built-in-theology of contemporary art?
 One can easily argue that knowledge about the divine 
revelation would be something else than knowledge about 
contemporary art or contemporary politics. On the other hand, 
one could argue that any judgment on contemporary art would 
be as mystifying as any judgment of the contemporary disciple  
— simply because our relation to contemporary art is not 
founded in judgments but in beliefs as metaphysical as the belief 
in the divine revelation.94 Is our relation to contemporary art 
not as mysterious, numinous and unexplainable as the structure 
of the exclamation: this is so contemporary? Are we not all 
 93. Kierkegaard, “The Case of the Contemporary Disciple,” 59.
 94. See Jones’ remark, in Berthold, Ursprung, Widrich, eds., Presence, 108.
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believers in the system of contemporary art? Who can say  
to what extent the belief plays a role in this system?  
In Kierkegaard’s case, the doubt is abyssal. Most impressive, 
yet monumental are his prayers, in which he calls upon  
Jesus to lead him and his fellow men into contemporaneity: 
What is past has no reality: to me; only the contemporary 
is reality to me. What you live contemporary with, is 
reality: to you. And any human being can thus only 
become contemporary: with the time in which he 
lives — and then with another, with the life of christ on 
earth, the holy history stand alone for itself, outside of 
history.95
For Kierkegaard, there cannot be any true contempora-
neity — if there can be any at all — other than in the act of 
believing, believing in the paradox that Jesus is human and 
divine at the same time. And even though we act today as  
if we somehow know better and how ridiculous Kierkegaard’s 
struggle was, we should be very aware of the theological 
remnants of our enlightened concepts, of the parallels between 
thinking the divine revelation and the ontological concepts  
of origin and event that will come into play in a moment —  
for the divine revelation is also something that can potentially  
come any time into the world to change it forever, like an  
event or like love or like a codification.
 The Archaeology of Contemporaneity
But what does the “event” of the divine revelation have to  
do with the arrival of a new love or a new codification?  
And what do these have to do with the fact that Kierkegaard,  
in his prayers, was also writing about contemporaneity as 
 95. Søren Kierkegaard, Indøvelse i Christendom [Training in Christianity], in Samlede 
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“outside of history”? It seems as if in all cases, we are not 
dealing with historical temporalities, but with “outsides” or 
“exteriorities of history,” which demand another temporality 
than the conventional historical one; they all form “origins” 
for which we still are in need of a proper discipline. Avanes-
sian and Malik talk about an “erosion of the primacy of the 
present”96 — an erosion that can be taken literally and  
understood materialistically, in terms of a discipline that works 
with erosions, with the effects of erosion, which is obviously 
geological in the first place, but also archaeological. This is  
why this “erosion of the primacy of the present” specifically, 
but also the discourse on post-contemporaneity in general, 
seems solidarity with the discipline of archaeology, with all 
possible archaeologies, that preoccupy themselves not only  
with the search for origins, but also with this “erosion of  
the primacy of the present,” simply because there is no 
presence in archaeology, there is no possible contemporaneity 
in archaeology — only, maybe, a possible archaeology of the 
contemporary. The discipline of archaeology is completely 
post-contemporary, as it always, and per definition, comes 
after any presence and after any contemporary moment. 
Archaeology, by definition, works with the remnants and left-
overs of people that are not present anymore to tell us about 
them — there are only deferrals and displacements, traces, 
and ruins in archaeology, in all archaeologies: effects of past 
contemporaneities. 
 But if there is no contemporaneity in archaeology —  
why then, should archaeology, any archaeology, be the proper 
discipline for the search for contemporaneity? Why should 
archaeology be the proper discipline of the untimely as well  
as of its materiality? And how can this materiality of time,  
this materiality of the contemporary become visible? We can  
of course avoid these questions and take a step backwards  
 96. Søren Kierkegaard, Indøvelse i Christendom [Training in Christianity], in Samlede 
Værker, vol. 16 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1962), 70f. Quote translated by Jacob Lund.
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and take up historical references and methodologies. We  
know that Foucault was referring to his discourse analyses  
as “archaeologies;” so did Freud and Benjamin, and so  
does Agamben today when he comments on the present age  
by diving deep down into historical situations and comments 
upon the present age through them.97 
 We have yet to understand that Agamben’s entire agenda 
is quite archaeological; all his main authors (such as Benjamin 
and Foucault) have experimented with archaeological epis-
temologies that had objects like the soul (Freud), modernity 
(Benjamin), or knowledge (Foucault) — and even media in 
the case of Kittler (whom Agamben does not cite). Moreover 
Agamben himself publishes one archaeology after another, in 
which he visits historical situations to explain our contemporary 
situation.98 But the question remains: Why and how can the 
contemporary be an object of an archaeology? Is the contem-
porary not the self-evident opposite of anything archaeological? 
How can there be an archaeology of the contemporary?  
And why do we need, why does the contemporary need,  
 just that? Why is the contemporary only reachable through 
archaeological means? 
 The contemporary is an extremely fragile object — if it is 
an object at all. It is hard to say if there is any substance to the 
contemporary or substantive contemporaneity,99 for hardly any 
object seems as fluid and ungraspable as this one. We cannot 
see our own time, we are practically blind to our immediate 
surroundings, and we do not recognize anything going on now. 
Only belatedly, the present can turn into light, into knowledge. 
This is the way Foucault’s objects of knowledge are constituted 
only afterwards, many years later. Presence is darkness,100  
 97. See Agamben, “Europa muss kollabieren.”
 98. See Agamben’s archaeological methodology in “Philosophical Archaeology,” in The 
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as Agamben says, we don’t know anything about our imme-
diate present. It has no access to truth or insight or enlighten-
ment, which is why presence is constituted by constant doubt 
and delatoriness.101 Presence is, as Groys writes, indecision, 
delatoriness, waste, and non-savoir.102 Recognition occurs,  
as history knows, always afterwards, when the day of facts is 
over and Minerva begins to fly. The present moment seems 
to be always already over, a purely negative103 concept that is 
always only reconstructed belatedly, a reconstruction of some-
thing that never existed, “a nostalgic remembering of a situa-
tion that might or might not have happened?”104 The present 
is always already over, we get access to the present only 
retrospectively by reconstructing past presences. It has always 
already slipped through our hands, ungraspable like sand that 
runs through our fingers. 
 This belated nature of the “living present” that is also, 
accor-ding to Derrida, a “dividing self-presence” and that 
“springs forth on the basis of its non self-identity”105 is also why 
any presence, any contemporary moment constitutes itself by 
first looking into the past. We do not need to cite philosophical 
examples to find out that most traditional authors thought that 
any immediacy and contemporaneity of the mind would institute 
itself by looking into the mirror of the past.106 The critique of 
the present moment is as old as philosophy itself. There is an 
entire tradition being sceptical about the immediate recognition 
of the moment as they state: The contemporary is not present.
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 But even though contemporaneity can only be retrieved 
by looking into the past, the past itself cannot only be historical, 
it should not only consist of documents, that can be interpreted 
in many ways, but also of monuments, to put it in Foucault’s 
words, also of materialities with their own epistemic value.  
This difference of epistemic value can be illustrated most 
easily by the difference of working materials of history and 
archaeology: of document and monument, the symbolic and the 
material, the readable and the visible. The basic tool and basic 
material for the historian to find out about past contemporane-
ities is the document, the written word that he has to evaluate 
and interpret. The archaeologist, on the contrary, does not 
reconstruct past contemporaneities by written words but by 
material findings and leftovers. Unlike the historian, he does  
not choose out of an abundance of historical sources that he  
has to evaluate, but is happy with anything that is handed  
down to him and which he does not have to censor to let past 
contemporaneities disappear like the historian. 
 One can easily illustrate the difference between monument 
and document, the material and symbolic worlds of represent- 
ing the past, by taking up another example by Floyer that was 
shown in the same exhibition mentioned earlier. Besides the 
aforementioned drop, there was a second piece called 1–25 
(2003) on display, which approached the matter of contempora-
neity not materially or visually, but symbolically: On a screen  
the numbers one to twenty-one appear in an irregular rhythm  
— written not as digits, but as words. Only after a while, the  
spectator notices that the seemingly irregular rhythm of appear-
ance of the numbers is identical to their measurement in time 
(for example, the word “three” is visible for three seconds, 
the word “twenty-one” for twenty-one seconds, and so on). 
Whereas both pieces seem to display the physical being of time, 
the materiality of 1–25 — the duration of visibility of the written 
numbers — stems not from the materiality of time itself, like  
in drop, but from its symbolic codification in the form of digits.
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 The Space of Contemporaneity
The two examples of artworks by Floyer illustrate the obvious 
fact that there are different approaches towards the past.  
As time-based works, they both question Osborne’s sketched 
transition from a “craft-based ontology of mediums to a  
postconceptual, transcategorical ontology of materializa-
tions.”107 But there are many more — and many more material 
or materialized — examples to illustrate the difference between 
a material and a symbolical approach to temporality, between 
Foucault’s monument and document (which is an opposition 
for which there were underlying artistic examples, I believe). 
Of course, this epistemic difference can also be illustrated by 
different artworks than Floyer’s, I will name another, very 
recent (contemporary) one. At documenta 14 in Athens,  
Lois Weinberger presented Debris field: Erkundungen im 
Abgelebten (2010 –2016), the results of an archaeological 
excavation executed in his own house — or better, in the house 
of his parents and grandparents, as the farm of his Austrian 
family dates back to the seventeenth century. He found old 
garments, animal corpses, puppet clothes, bones, garbage, 
crucifixes, ropes and shoes, many many shoes. So why does 
he show us all this debris? Why does he excavate his family 
history?
 Because obviously he does not want to narrate his family 
history, he excavates it instead of narrating it. Narrating 
uncovers a specific temporality, of chronology, linearity  
and continuity, one always starts to narrate at the beginning.  
When you excavate something, it’s the other way around,  
you find the youngest findings at first, and things may be as 
mixed up as the dirt in the ground. Also the debris tells another 
story in itself, not the ideal version of wishful thinking, but  
the Real that is covered by it.
 But one does not have to refer to examples from the 
material world of fine arts to illustrate this epistemic difference, 
 107. Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 28.
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it can much easier be illustrated by everyday examples — the 
afterlife of a dinner party at a table, for example. One can 
either abide to its historical account and let its story be told to 
you, or you can consult the remnants and leftovers in them-
selves: the debris field of the dinner. There is naturally a 
fundamental epistemic difference between seeing the leftovers 
themselves, or reading a document about them, or hearing a 
narration about them. Whereas the historical account, whether 
oral or written, transforms everything into language, symbols 
and digits, the archaeological report first consults the remnants 
themselves to decipher them, at the beginning not knowing in 
which language or logic to read them, to reconstruct any past 
contemporaneity.
 As we see, history and archaeology sequence and order 
their knowledge about past contemporaneities in a totally 
different way. Taking up the simple example of the party, 
that is less complex than a family history, the historian would 
start with its beginnings: who had the idea for the party, how 
did it come about, who organized it and what was the course 
of events? The historian proceeds not via synchronicity and 
simultaneity, but by the diachronic and successive course 
of events, narrating who brought what to the party at what 
time — which can be decisive for the course of any party, as 
we know — following models of linearity and causality, telling us 
what happened as a result of which historical circumstances. 
An archaeologist coming the next morning (or a thousand years 
later) to examine the debris field of remnants, having dug out 
the decomposed leftovers of the party, would sequence the 
events the other way around, beginning with the visible effects, 
the remains and leftovers and would have to figure out the 
earlier events by way of them. Ignorant of any documents as 
well as of the linear and causal knowledge of the historian, their 
knowledge of the contemporary is completely material; the 
archaeologist has to reconstruct everything by simply looking 
at what he sees and to figure out the course of events, starting 
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from debris. Their archaeology of the very same party (or of 
a farmhouse) would simply consult the table of leftovers, and 
would see the whole mess of a past contemporaneity simulta-
neously and not sequenced by a semantic corset. That is the 
archaological image, in which everything is visible simultane-
ously, no matter if it happened sooner or later —“image [...] 
wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now 
to form a constellation.”108
 Eventually, we have two totally different epistemic  
models of contemporaneity: the historical model with its time 
bar, chronology, causality and linearity; and the archaeological 
simultaneous image of many past contemporary moments. 
We indeed know this opposition between chronology and 
simultaneity, narration and image, time and space quite well 
from the history of aesthetics. In his 1766 classic Laokoon, 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing made the sharp and classic distinc-
tion between the temporal arts (poetry, literature, music, today 
also film and video) and the spatial arts (painting and sculpture) 
that would unfold in space — the temporal arts succeeding 
one another in time, whereas the spatial arts sequencing them 
through forms and colours in space next to each other.109
 Very different temporalities indeed: whereas history relies 
on the construction of historical time, archaeological space is 
constituted by material findings; history aligns events in chrono-
logical order, it ends up with a linear time bar of important 
moments, but there is no time bar in archaeology’s spaces, 
which form a three-dimensional medium that is very different 
from the symbolic medium of writing. Archaeology shows us in 
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a spatial dimension what once was, instead of narrating some-
thing in time; it shows us all there was, in reverse chronology, 
without any personal judgment, and not what subjects or  
disciplines or media chose to let remain from the past.  
So what will remain in archaeology — or in archives that try 
to guarantee this anonymity — will do so for very different 
reasons than what remains in history. Things (like the leftovers 
of a party) remain or they do not; they are dug out or remain 
forever unseen. But they are not totally dependant on what 
people decided to pass on and deliver, but are handed down 
materially (maybe because worms didn’t decompose it yet  
or because terrorists didn’t blow it up yet).
 In other words, spatial arts, as archaeology, show 
different things next to each other at the same time, estab-
lishing these different times and phenomena as being contem-
porary to one another.110 This phenomenon, that has been 
much referenced as Ernst Bloch’s famous “non-contempora-
neous contemporaneities” and which has been located histor-
ically in the methodology of the montage within the historical 
avantgardes, seems to be simply a phenomenon of anything 
visual — an effect of a gaze, that sees many things at  
the same time, being always interstratified with different  
contemporaneities of different ages. But before we release  
a phenomenology or archaeology of the gaze,111 we can  
come back to the question of why we need an archaeology to 
find out about the contemporary? Why of all the mentioned 
disciplines should archeology be able to tell us what is or  
once was contemporary?
 What is the Contemporary? 
In Agamben’s “What is the Contemporary?” of 2008,  
a short but yet beautiful Benjaminian text, there is a passage 
on that strange connection between contemporaneity and 
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archaeology — a concept used by Agamben to refer to his 
“historical” case studies.112 But even though Agamben elab-
orates a philosophical concept of contemporaneity, he doesn’t 
make the transcendental manoeuvre. Instead, he departs from 
notions of the contemporary and “untimely” by Nietzsche and 
Osip Mandelstam. He defines the contemporary as a quality  
of temporal difference, of discontinuity and rupture: the person 
is untimely, one who is distant and different from his own age, 
who introduces a temporal difference into it. But how does 
the untimely transform into the contemporary? What does 
the untimely have to do with the contemporary? Are they not 
simply opposites?
 It seems as if the fundamental deferral between the 
contemporary and the untimely is needed to produce historical 
recognition or a recognition of the temporal. “But precisely 
of this condition, precisely through this disconnection and this 
anachronism, they are more capable than others of perceiving 
and grasping their own time.”113 It is this fundamental differ-
ence within temporality, this distortion that renders possible 
any kind of historical recognition in the first place. But what  
is this quality of temporal difference, this “anachronism,”  
that Georges Didi-Huberman taught us so much about,114  
this distortion in the first place? Here, Agamben gives a para-
doxical answer saying that contemporariness is “a relationship 
with time that adheres to it through a disjunction and an  
anachronism.”115 
 The untimely is thus a special kind of contemporary:  
s/he is the contemporary who is close and distant from  
her/his own time at the same time, who “adheres” to it  
while being “disjuncted” from it. But how can we think this 
disjuncted adherence, this adhering disjunctedness? One  
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good image of thought (Denkbild) to illustrate the entanglement 
of the contemporary and the untimely is the German notion 
Verwindung, meaning twist or distortion. The untimely is the 
distorted contemporary, the contemporary that somehow got 
twisted. It was Gianni Vattimo who reminded us that this notion 
was brought up by the very tradition sketched here, not only  
by Heidegger, but foremost by Nietzsche, to illustrate his 
famous idea of the untimely.116 Naturally, at first everyone 
thinks about Verwindung as the Heideggerian concept of a 
surpassing and overcoming of metaphysics without Aufhebung, 
but applying this concept to the untimely, the untimely is the 
distorted contemporary: the one who adheres to one’s contem-
porary epoch but gets distorted somehow — or that gets 
distorted but somehow survives this distortion.
 The order, in which the concepts of adherence and 
distortion appear, is somehow crucial. For Vattimo reminded 
us that the second German signification of Verwindung lies in 
the verb verwinden, which does not only mean to get distorted, 
but to cure, to heal and to recover from an illness. So if we try 
to think less about metaphysics, as Heidegger did, and more 
about the temporality of the contemporary under the concept 
of Verwindung, we end up with the notion of a difference 
that stays true to its origin — with an untimely that can only 
be so because one is somehow true to one’s time — that can 
overcome one’s time because one didn’t leave it altogether. 
The untimely verwindet one’s time, he recuperates his epoch, 
because something has stayed with him: “It is something one 
retains in oneself, like the traces of an illness or a sorrow to 
which one is resigned.”117 Should we not think the contem-
porary in the temporality of an illness, meaning not from the 
optimistic perspective of the self-evident subject, but out of  
the perspective of the reconvalescent who looks at his scars? 
This means not so much the perspective of the author of  
 116. See Vattimo, “Verwindung.”
 117. Ibid., 12.6. See Vattimo, “Verwindung.”  117. Ibid., 12.
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A la recherche du temps perdu with his desire to reconstruct, 
in the end, the famous “time lost” (who also wrote and recon-
structed the time lost out of the perspective of the recon-
valescent), but more to look at the contemporary out of the 
perspective of someone who simply looks back, recognizing 
that one is at another point than before, recuperating the 
distortion. This would be the third signification of Verwindung, 
a radical change of perspective, a radical rethinking and looking 
back at the history from a different, distorted perspective.
 Put simply, one can say that there are two ways of 
thinking the Verwindung needed to become truly contempo-
rary: one can think Verwindung with the means of a temporal 
twist or with a material distortion, it can be thought temporally 
or materially. First, Agamben, not mentioning any Verwindung, 
seems to think his paradoxical term of contemporariness only 
temporally, meaning through notions of time. The contempo-
rary who for him adheres to their time while being in disjunction 
with it, is the one who is close and distant to the origin at the 
same time. So contemporaneity for Agamben finally amounts to 
being close to the origin, to comprise the origin. The closeness 
to the origin is the distortion one needs to be contemporary: 
“Contemporariness inscribes itself in the present by marking 
it above all as archaic. Only he who perceives the indices and 
signatures of the archaic in the most modern and recent can be 
contemporary.”118 
 The Ruins of the Contemporary
But what is this strange notion of the archaic and what does 
it have to do with the contemporary? The one who is contem-
porary somehow has to squint into time, to be cross-eyed. 
While seeing one’s contemporary epoch, one also has to see 
its archaic nature at the same time — the gaze upon one’s age 
will only be contemporary if it also sees the archaic. Agamben 
provides a very tangible example of this squinted gaze, which is 
 118. Agamben, “What is the Contemporary?” 50.,” 50.
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the sight of Manhattan when arriving from the sea: “Whoever 
has seen the skyscrapers of New York for the first time 
arriving from the ocean at dawn has immediately perceived  
this archaic facies of the present, this contiguousness with  
the ruin that the atemporal images of September 11 [2001] 
have made evident to us all.”119 
 Of course, we know the aesthetics of the ruin since 
Romanticism and earlier, but Agamben’s “contiguousness  
with the ruin” indicates something else: the ability not only to 
see the present or contemporary moment, to drown in pres-
ence, but also to be able to see the contemporary moment 
within its dimension, its historical extent and embeddedness. 
The untimely has not only to see the glamour of presence  
(and the glamour of the present), but its age, its becoming,  
its being-a-ruin, as in the case of Manhatten. Or as in the  
case of Benjamin’s Arcades Project, in which he brought up  
a million examples of the simultaneity of contemporary Paris 
with the ruin, to show not contemporary New York’s,  
but modern Paris’s “contiguousness with the ruin.”
 But Agamben’s example is not the eternal image of New 
York, like Heidegger’s is the eternal view of the greek temple 
and Benjamin’s are the eternal ruins of contemporary Athens  
— it is the image of the skyscrapers of Manhatten in a specific 
moment in time. And for him, it is not the metahistorical  
Greek temple above of all times that serves as example of 
atemporality, but the “atemporal images of September 11th.” 
The image of 9/11 for Agamben is as atemporal as Victor 
Hugo’s Paris, often cited by Benjamin, because it has uncov-
ered not an ontological origin as in Heidegger, but a historical 
origin as in Foucault, ripped open the smooth surface of the 
image of New York and unveiled something, which was hidden 
within this image. 9/11 was not only the beginning of a global 
media public of contemporaries that watched this image simul-
taneously, that was broadcasted or streamed live into all parts 
 119. Agamben, “What is the Contemporary?” 50f.,” 50f.
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of the world, it was a true origin for something archaic. The 
image of the ruin, was unveiled or dug out under the shockingly 
new, an event which we unfortunately still feel contemporary 
to, as if there was a “natural” iconic connection from the ruins 
of the World Trade Center to the ruins of Palmyra.
 The Visibility of Contemporaneity 
One can easily refuse to accept Agamben’s example of the 
image of Manhattan in different methodologies. The gaze of the 
untimely can be declined temporally as well as spatially, visually 
as well as ontologically. It might be refused temporally as deep 
time, when we say that the squinted eye sees several things 
at the same time in a form of double exposure.120 But it can be 
also deciphered spatially, when we talk about a deep image of 
New York that is hidden in its conventional one, when we say 
that the contemporary has to see “right through” the present 
to see its foundation, its ruin at the bottom. This is why the 
contemporary has to squint: to not only see the present, but 
also to not let oneself be blinded by the present and its shine 
and gleam, and instead to perceive its foundation, its skeleton, 
its “facies” as Agamben says. But to get to the “facies,”  
one has not to ignore something to see something behind it 
(this would be interpretation), but to see something within 
something, to see the “facies” within an appearance — to see 
the being in that which has being, which amounts to the classic 
retreat from Sein to Seiendes. 
 But if we reach being only by that which has being, it must 
be in the world, appear and emerge in it; thus it must have 
or contain a certain look. In his Introduction to Metaphysics, 
Heidegger writes: “Appearing also means: as something that 
is already standing there, to proffer a foreground, a surface, 
a look as an offering to be looked at.”121 Heidegger’s prime 
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example of the extraordinary visibility of being is, as we know, 
not New York at dawn, but the Greek temple: “The temple, 
in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men 
their outlook on themselves.”122
 There is being in the look, in the outer appearance,  
being contains a look — and who would disagree with the state-
ment that the contemporary also operates via looks, that the 
contemporary always has a look, gives itself to a look, seems 
maybe most graspable by a look? This is why the archae-
ology of contemporaneity is inclined towards visibility — one 
can easily state that contemporaneity through itself is inclined 
towards visibility; what is contemporary is visible and what is 
visible is contemporary — we just need to learn to see it. In 
this primary visibility also lies in the political importance of the 
contemporary: contemporaneity is about visibility; what is said 
to be contemporary is or gets visible; it is selected by a mass 
of events to get visible. But if contemporaneity is connected 
to a regime of visibility, if only the contemporary gets visible, 
visibility has a highly political character. What (political) events 
are we contemporary to? What gets visible and what does not?
It is important not to confuse the aforementioned conver-
gence of contemporaneity and visibility with the position of 
philosophical aesthetics — with its “emphatic insistence on the 
presentness of action, aesthetics or experience,”123 and with 
its unconditioned defense of the historical,124 that also defends 
contemporaneity as the locus of any political action,125 but 
without yet considering the problematic (in)visibility of any truly 
contemporary phenomenon. Even though it claims to consider 
contemporary phenomenona in its emancipatory political 
actions, it deprives itself of the very means to see them in the 
first place, which is also why one first needs an epistemology of 
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the contemporary phenomenon before one can begin to speak 
about it.
 In this convergence between contemporaneity and visibility 
lies also, and again, its closeness to being, or emergence —  
for what is, emerges, before our eyes. Therefore, there is not 
only the look of the contemporary, but also the contemporary 
look, maybe the contemporary in the end is a look, is nothing 
but a look? In other words, the reason why the contempo-
rary is giving itself so easily to the look, why it seems to be 
most graspable by the gaze is not because contemporaneous 
phenomena are there, at hand, but more so because there is  
a closeness of contemporaneity to being, which operates  
via its look.
 But in this convergence of visibility and being one might 
see much more than the obvious reason for the “ontological” 
fascination of fashion, that both Benjamin and Agamben cite 
as their first example of contemporaneity,126 — the “being” 
at the bottom of the surfaces — that is the very rationale for 
the nexus of contemporaneity and contemporary art. It is in 
the look and in the outlook of things that we find the structure 
of being — not just their surface but the very essence of their 
temporal structure and of the temporality of contemporaneity. 
Put simply, the alliance of art with contemporaneity lies in 
the simple fact that the contemporary first gets visible, not 
thinkable, or sayable. It gets visible before it gets thinkable,  
this is why the visual disciplines of art (and fashion) are much 
closer to the contemporary than history or theology — which  
is also why archaeology as the discipline of the visible is the 
most likely to grasp it.
 But contemporary’s visibility consists not only in hiding 
or unveiling a discrete structure of being, but also, according 
to Foucault’s “historical a priori,” a discrete structure of 
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becoming. It becomes most obvious if we turn to another, 
geological signification of the term “facies,” that brings it much 
closer not only to Benjamin’s examination of the geology of 
the city of Paris, but also to his method of embedding contem-
porary Paris in its historical and geological formation history: 
“facies” defines also all properties of stones that result from 
their formation history. Therefore, in Agamben’s use of the 
“facies,” the aforementioned temporal and the spatial model 
of contemporaneity are overlapping: contemporary is the one 
who is capable of perceiving and deciphering any present and 
“contemporary” image as archaic as a rock. This is to be 
understood less metaphorically but literally, meaning not only 
that one has to be capable to solidify and freeze the image of 
the present for it to become eternal, but inversely that one  
has to be able to liquify and fluidify the eternal image of a rock 
(or the skyscrapers) to also see all archaic traces of their 
formation history. 
 The Contemporary Origin
Eventually, the contemporary image is, or has to be deciphered 
as, archaic as a rock. But why is the archaic so central to 
Agamben, what is unveiled by the archaic? “‘Archaic’ means 
close to the arché, that is to say, the origin, but the origin is 
not only situated in a chronological past: it is contemporary with 
historical becoming and does not cease to operate in it,” which 
is why he defines contemporariness as “proximity to the origin 
that nowhere pulses with more force than in the present.”127 
 This stunning passage seems to explain the mysterious 
nexus of archaeology and contemporaneity. For this definition 
crosses the concepts of the archaic with the origin, summarizes 
and yet concentrates Agamben’s temporal and spatial defi-
nitions of the contemporary. But why does he talk about the 
origin all the time in the first place — a term that he (together 
with occidental culture in general) seems to be quite obsessed 
 127. Agamben, “What is the Contemporary?,” 50.
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with? And why (and this may seem even more weird) does he 
place the origin in the present, when he writes that “both this 
distancing and nearness, which define contemporariness, have 
their foundation in this proximity to the origin that nowhere 
pulses with more force than in the present”? 
 In Agamben’s example of New York, “the origin pulses 
in the present” as the image of the ruins is wrapped in its 
conventional image or like the formation history of any stone 
is wrapped in its look, its “facies.” Agamben provides even 
more lively examples: the contemporary “does not cease to 
operate in it [historical becoming], just as the embryo continues 
to be active in the tissues of the mature organism, and the child 
in the psychic life of the adult.”128 And in his “Philosophical 
Archaeology,” he brings up an “operative force within history” 
that is active in the same way as “the child of psychoanalysis 
exerting an active force in the psychic life of the adult.”129 
These very strong examples indicate the “contiguousness”  
of the origins that Agamben is talking about: he is not  
talking about a beginning as “chronological past,” meaning a 
historical origin that loses its strength and activity once it is 
instituted, but rather about a beginning that keeps its force  
and presence instead of losing it — an origin that keeps on 
being contemporary with what was once originated.130
 This difference between the beginning as historical and 
chronological past and the origin as ongoing temporal presence 
is best expressed by a dark but yet lucid differentiation that 
Benjamin once used in his famous Preface to The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama of 1928:
 
Origin [Ursprung], although an entirely historical cate-
gory, has, nevertheless, nothing to do with genesis 
 128. Ibid.
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[Entstehung]. The term origin is not intended to describe 
the process by which the existant came into being [kein 
Werden des Entsprungenen], but rather to describe that 
which emerges from the process of becoming and disap-
pearance [dem Werden und Vergehen Entspringendes]. 
Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its 
current it swallows the material involved in the process of 
genesis.131
In this enigmatic text, at least in its original German version, 
Benjamin differentiates between constituting time and consti-
tuted time, between the originating (Entspringendes) and the 
originated (Entsprungenes). This difference is not rendered 
sufficiently by the English version that reads the Entsprungene 
as “the process by which the existant came into being” and the 
Entspringendes as “that which emerges from the process of 
becoming and disappearance”— a difference which designates, 
beyond the temporal difference of the verb, a difference of 
activity: the originating is still active and operating whereas  
the originated is already past and cut off from any presence. 
The active and ongoing quality of the origin is secured by the  
concept of contemporaneity; an origin is the place that welcomes 
the past into the present, an opening of the present to the  
past and of the present to the future, that is not past at all,  
but “the place of an operation that actualizes its efficiency.”132
 Agamben is very clear on this point, when he defines as 
origin only that which is still effective. To constitute an origin, 
something does not necessarily have to be old, but can lie also 
in the present — which is why “for this reason, archaeology… 
 131. The German version reads: “Ursprung, wiewohl durchaus historische Kategorie, 
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Benjamin, “Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels,” in Gesammelte Schriften I.1, ed. Rolf Tiede-
mann (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1991), 226.
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constitutes the only path of access to the present.”133 But 
why in the world should “archaeology” open “the only path of 
access to the present,” just because this discipline is the old 
origin seeker, specialized in finding, interpreting and exploiting 
origins? Is not archaeology even further away from contem-
poraneity than history? Yes and no: yes, as most of the time 
it deals with ages of which there is no historical record yet; 
no, as lately archaeologies of historical ages have also been 
developed, like industrial archaeology for example or garbage 
archaeology, which provide historical times with a different, 
material image of itself — or that give a material image of 
temporalities which in themselves are not, or not yet, historical. 
This paradox lies at the heart of Agamben’s thought: the 
paradoxical closeness of contemporaneity and archaeology of 
presence and origin. We learn from him that surprisingly, the 
mirror of the contemporary is not “the past,” but “the origin,” 
that origin and contemporaneity belong paradoxically together. 
The paradox lies in the fact that the contemporary, in this 
definition, integrates the past into the present (the untimely) — 
but a past that is still active, still alive and somehow “present” 
and not yet outdated. The origin thus is, and I repeat this very 
messianic and very Benjaminian definition, “the place of an 
operation that has yet to obtain its effects.”
 This is Agamben’s dialectics of origin. One’s origin is not  
over and outdated, but up-to-date and active — as the contem- 
porary is not only active in the present, but also welcomes the 
past. But we do not just need the past to get access to the 
present, every present moment constructs its own past  
— which gets nowhere as visible as in the field of the artworld, 
where all of a sudden dozens of 1970s artists emerged out of 
nothing, as if they had just been invented.134 As every contem-
poraneity constructs its own past, its own origins, the origins 
remain active in any contemporary moment. But if origins are 
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still active in the present and if the contemporary is not the 
opposite of the origin, if any true contemporaneity needs and 
relies on its origins, then we are also shifting and distorting  
the understanding of archaeology — of an archaeology, that is 
not looking for the old anymore, but for that which is still effec-
tive today. Conventionally, we would expect that one exam-
ines a present moment as an effect of a cause, which lies per 
definition in the past. The trick of Agamben’s and Benjamin’s 
archaeologist of the contemporary is that he searches — not 
for the originated, but for the emerging and originating — for 
the effective past, or, more general, for all effective operations 
that lie in the past as well as in the present. 
 Agamben’s contemporaneity is surely solidary with the 
search for the originating instead of the originated, as he looks 
for the gold dust of the arising past, for the active and effec-
tive past, for the acts of constituting time instead of working 
within an already constituted time — a solidary in opposition 
to the one between archaeology (working with the process of 
constitution of time) and history (operating within a constituted 
time). History deals with the Entsprungenes, the originated, 
which is why history and archaeology differ by reason of the 
qualitative difference of their temporalities: the archaeologist 
working within Benjamin’s Strudel of originating time, whereas 
the historian is working within the calmer realm of the docu-
mented past. In constrast to the historian, the archaeologist 
searches not for dates within an existing temporality, but for 
temporalities all new, for the emergence of temporalities whose 
origin will stay as long with them as they exist. This is why the 
relation between archaeology and history is identical to the 
relation of constituted time and constituting time as “the place 
of an operation that has yet to obtain its effects.”
 But what is an “effective operation,” other than being, 
which this clever wording visibly avoids? I would say that an 
operation is effective, if it is not yet finished, if it has not yet 
become history, but if it is still historical enough not to fall 
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into the timeless abyss of being: almost historical, but not yet 
ontological; too ontological to be historical and too historical 
to be transcendental — a historical repetition of the transcen-
dental. This is the temporality (or layer) of the phenomena, 
Agamben searches for together with Benjamin. In other words, 
their origin designates events that happened in the past — but 
in an unpast past that still influences us and that is still active; 
inversely, directly emanating from this concept of origin, is  
a contemporaneity that reaches back into the past — but into 
a past that is still active enough not to yet become history. 
This original contemporaneity thus designates a time zone 
in between the historical and the ontological: it is ontological 
enough not to be on the farside but on the nearside of history, 
but it is at the same time historical enough not to become  
ontological. Anyone who is searching for codifications that are 
still active today is looking for originating temporalities, which  
lie closer — but not closer on the time bar — to the present 
than historical temporalities. Because objects are the constitu-
ating and instituating forces of the present moment, no matter 
how long they are past, one can say that the archaeologist  
is working closer to the present: because s/he is looking for  
the codification of the present. The archaeologist does not  
take temporalities for granted. This is why Agamben describes 
the work of the archaeologist as “going back in time.”135  
The archaeologist explores the access or the grounds of the 
present moment — and this ground, one could add, does not 
have to be the oldest one. It rarely is.
 The Birth of the New
This present-ness makes archaeology for Agamben the 
discipline of advents and beginnings of the contemporary: 
“The moment of arising, the arché of archaeology, is what 
will take place, what will become accessible and present, only 
 135. Agamben, “Philosophical Archaeology,” 104.
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when archaeological inquiry has completed its operation.”136 
So if the “archaeological inquiry” looks for these “moments 
of arising,” that have not ended yet, no matter if they lie in 
the present or in the past, and if these “moments of arising” 
bear the seal of true contemporaneity, then it is archaeology, 
and only archaeology, that is always already looking for the 
contemporary: “The point of archaeology is to gain access to 
the present for the first time.”137 If the contemporary is about 
beginnings, something that has begun, that is in dawn and has 
not ended yet, it is the job of the archaeologist to find them: 
“With a singular gesture, the archaeologist pursuing such an 
apriori retreats… toward the present.”138 But how do we know 
if something is really present and active and if it has not ended 
yet? How do we know if something is still contemporary or  
not? How do we know whether a love is still contemporary  
or if it has already long ended, if there is still the official  
commitment, or if there is still grief and mourning for the other, 
even when there is no longer any official commitment, or even 
in dreams and thoughts? The scene is already a cliché in which 
two lovers cannot agree on a common history, on common 
beginnings and ends (one saying, “it had begun long before  
that for me”— the other one answering, “but it had already 
ended, then, for me”). 
 It seems almost to be a definition of the contemporary, 
that it is hardly possible to assign a date to it; what we call 
“contemporary” denotes the fragility and instability of tempo-
rality itself — its burning subjectivity, but also its shaky histo-
ricity, that changes any time we call upon it (which is also the 
case with love’s temporality, that alters any time you refer 
to it, and which might have best been expressed by Bertrand 
Russell’s famous quote: “I didn’t know I loved you until I heard 
myself saying so”). Another, more “serious” example of the 
 136. Ibid., 105.
 137. Ibid., 106.





fragility of contemporaneity and the shakenness of its histo-
ricity is at the same time the example of contemporaneity itself: 
nothing more shaky, fluctuating and unsteady as the concept 
of “contemporary art”! Are there any two similar definitions 
of any piece of contemporary art? Does anybody agree on 
the contemporaneity of contemporary art? To some people, 
Matisse is still contemporary, to others last season’s artists  
are not contemporary anymore. To many students, the 
entirety of the twentieth century has already become historical, 
whereas the 2000s seem “contemporary.” When is an artistic 
œuvre still contemporary, for we know that many people still 
feel contemporary to Cézanne or Duchamp, as does Didi- 
Huberman, who compares the ready mades with prehistoric 
burial objects.139 If one states that Duchamp is still our contem-
porary — and it is always Duchamp that is taken as model  
for this being “still our contemporary”140 — it means that his 
art still has effects upon us, that it has not yet become history.  
And true, maybe not the worst definition of the contempo-
rary would be that we feel something is contemporary, if its 
newness has not ceased, if it is still alive, still going on — like a 
piece of art that still affects us, no matter how long it is past.
 On the other hand, we have to be very aware of the fact 
that contemporary art is also operating at the other end of the 
time scale of contemporaneity, that is to say in its staging of 
new beginnings. The historical avantgardes (that are gener-
ally taken by many as the model for contemporary art) have 
always worked heavily on their acts of birth and their visible 
demarcation from the past.141 The avantgardes have invested 
heavily in disruptions and new codifications of time, which is 
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why every piece of true contemporary art tries to achieve  
the very same thing — a caesura, a revelation: a new origin. 
This is also why calling a piece of art “contemporary” does 
not only imply a judgment on its quality, but on its temporality. 
Artists, no matter how modest they are, do not only want to 
hear that we like their work, but that it initiates a new epoch,  
a new beginning, that sets it apart from all history before. 
 The Wilderness of the Internet
This seems to be the case with post-internet art, which 
represents (or presents itself as) a new, paradoxical origin, 
that negates art history completely.142 In the already famous 
9th Berlin Biennale, there were hardly any references to  
art history displayed, but even more creation myths full 
of water, mythical scenes and phantastic narration, digital 
offsprings and mythical disruptions, new origins full of strange 
digital creatures, creeping out of primordial ooze. All of a 
sudden, with this “generic, future” art, to use Schwarte’s  
title “Notations for Future Art,”143 we find ourselves within  
a “new aesthetics,” simply because the digital is a new coding,  
a new arché. Moreover arché means, following Derrida,144  
a new law and, at the same time, the site of execution of this 
new law: which is in this case the new code, the digital code. 
Digital code breaks everything up and makes everything new, 
transposing everything else into its universal code.145 
 This is also why so many “contemporary” artists are 
nowadays working with errors in transposing processes, with 
errors in coding practices, errors in between different codes or 
in between the analog and the digital — producing what is now 
 142. Post-internet art would thus act contrarily to contemporary art that, according 
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called glitch, mash, meme, or moshing art. This is also why 
we see so many ruptures and discontinuities in post-internet 
art, because dicontinuity is not only an attribute or a charac-
teristic of digital code. It is its way of being itself, discontinuity 
is digital’s ontological order, its arché, which is why we see so 
many ruptures and cuts. For example in the videos of Ryan 
Trecartin, discontinuities not just of the image, but also of their 
sound, which breaks up, is cut off, before anybody has ended 
speaking. Here, we are not dealing with a human rhythm  
and temporality anymore, but with a technical and posthuman 
one. There is a new wilderness of the image as an effect of its 
new coding, a new, maybe monstrous version of Baudelaire’s 
paradis artificiels, totally immersed inside the internet reality, 
which results in a certain sense of desolatedness and devast-
edness. After a new coding, things have not yet settled, even 
though the digital code is relatively stable, its appearance is not. 
We are dealing with a fundamental instability of a new order, 
instability of everything: instability of the aesthetic, but also  
of the epistemic, the epistemology of the image, instability of 
the persons we see, their gender, their role, their agency. 
There is also an instability of the relation between people and 
things, which have lost their hierarchy with the new coding: 
which results in this carnival-esque situations, with people 
wearing wigs and pupil-less, acorea contact lenses which we 
are visually harrassed by in Trecartin’s videos. 
 His show in Berlin’s Kunst-Werke in 2014 expanded the 
sense of wilderness into the institutional space, that felt more 
like a multiplex-cinema stuffed with technology than an art  
institution — a wilderness of hidden technology scattered 
around within a camping scene of scattered tents and sleeping 
bags and outdoor seats and beds in front of several screens, 
one of which showed an old freemason’s church out of service. 
While technology was doing many things that one did not see 
anymore, in this anti-minimalist, anti-modernist gesture, there 
was a total loss of all medium-specificity into a state which 
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Rosalind Krauss has called the “post-medium condition” in all 
its hysterical theatricality. 
 What Benjamin once said about film, that “brings to light 
entirely new structures of matter,”146 also applies to these 
digital images that have somehow changed their matter.  
This is why we see so many artists, even if not video artists, 
working with materiality and matter in virtual times, with new 
matters, which was also the theme of the now famous Kassel 
Fridericianum show “Speculations on Anonymous Materials”:147 
a digital materiality, a materiality after, post-internet. This new 
materiality, in its very arepresentational and “anonymous” 
regime, not only illustrates very well Foucault’s concept of the 
arepresentational “monument,” it is itself illustrated by the 
following Schwarte passage on the ontological change of works 
of (post-internet) art: 
Future works of art are not characterized anymore 
through a certain materiality, not anymore through medial 
operations, not even through the formation of relations 
[...] These works of art form a reality on their own, 
beyond and autonomous of the spectator’s conscience. 
They form scenes of change, of reorientation, descriptions 
of the negation of continuous, chronological time.148
Speculations on anonymous materials also linked the theme 
of post-internet to the philosophical discourse on speculative 
realism, which also deals with anonymous, non-subjective or 
posthuman accesses to the world. Even though it seems  
as if the connection between post-internet art to speculative 
realism was a clever marketing tool, there seems to be  
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a connection between a philosophical position that — beginning 
with Quentin Meillassoux’s poststructuralist logics — postu-
lates the withdrawal of the Kantian idea of the world’s very 
constructedness.149 It tried to accept this broken world as such 
with a post-internet art that claimed that its artworks would 
not refer to individual artist-subjects (and their constructions of 
the world), but to the machines, media, and networks through 
which they were sent and which had built them in the first 
place — and thus the claim of referencelessness, detachedness 
and isolatedness of the materials and things of the world linked 
the artworks to “their” philosophy.
 One often gets the impression that this famous “second 
nature” of the medium is becoming for many digital natives 
their first nature, that they receive their strongest and most 
vital impressions via the internet and not via the real world 
(whatever that was).150 So the “post” of post-internet art 
might mean: after they had been on the internet, after they  
had been affected or infected by it. Everything from now on 
carries its virus, its genes, its digital code. Nothing remains 
unaffected by it. Nobody escapes the digital anymore.
 After having seen too much post-internet art, I once 
dreamt of stages or stagelike sites where nobody ever 
rehearsed, all the time somebody was taking you onto a stage 
where things were recorded. Everything was being recorded 
and shown at the same time, which led to the impression  
that any spatial separation of stage and spectator was absent 
or destroyed, and you were constantly looking at something 
but at the same time being looked at. There was no invisibility 
in the scenery and all the time there was something happening, 
one just never knew what, and there was always somebody 
approaching you and talking to you and doing something to  
you or to someone else without beginning or end.
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 The Recurrence of the Old
Even if we all know how important and fragile beginnings are,  
it somehow seems as if ends are even more so. In these situa-
tions of impure beginnings and endings, when nobody knows  
if (official) history has begun or ended, it is the archaeologist 
who goes deeper. Within the concealed temporalities of art  
and love, the archaeologist searches for caulky traces of begin-
nings, travels back to a region before time and before history, 
to a point of dawn, when time is not constituted yet and a new 
temporality is born. Because the contemporary is not only 
that which has not ended yet, it is also, and more importantly 
maybe, that which has just begun. In order not to end,  
something has to have begun. 
 But if the contemporary is about what has begun and if 
archaeology is about beginnings, what is a beginning? And who 
is to say “when the present begins?”151 A beginning is a slight 
caesura, a rupture in time, a discontinuity. Any time we call 
something “contemporary,” we feel something new, that is 
setting a distance to the past. We perceive a slight rupture in 
time, a nearly imperceptible discontinuity: that is Agamben’s 
imperceptible origin, as imperceptible as a new codification of 
a computer programme that changes the very nature of what 
it shows. This is the contemporary: a temporal difference that 
is coding something new, that opens up a new quality, as the 
religious revelation Kierkegaard talks about or as with a new 
love that changes everything in our lives. For it is one of love’s 
clichéd ideals that it acts as a new creation and revival, that 
leads the other to true contemporaneity. It is just through the 
eyes of the other that recognizes me, that I am seen in my 
essence, that I am beginning a new life, and that I am coded 
anew. 
 One misunderstands the idea of the discontinuity  
(or one does not reach into its depths), if one only applies 
it to historical periodizations (for example, of the “birth” of 
 151. Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 25.
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contemporary art, that may be randomly dated as 1945, 1965, 
1989)152 — historical periodizations, which remain astonishingly 
stable, also that misunderstand Agamben’s idea of original 
caesuras. Moreover the current critique of contemporary art 
not producing any true origins anymore, to just superficially 
be originell (in German) instead of original, misses the depth 
of the idea of discontinuity that does not play within a historical 
register in the first place.153 The caesura of an origin runs  
much deeper than (art) historical periodizations, as it has to 
touch the real, the matter, that unfolds new temporalities  
that underlie any historicity, which is also why it cannot be 
debated like historical periodization — not because the data are 
“right” or “wrong,” but because they do not touch what they 
are talking about sufficiently: historical consciousness talking 
only to itself in a purely self-referential discourse, driven by  
the idea of historical “progress.”154 But artistic (and personal) 
origins are much wilder than any normative “system,”  
as they do not represent anything — so contemporary art  
has not the mission to convey or represent contemporaneity,  
it is not a “cultural carrier of contemporaneity”155 — no  
historical evolution and no contemporary conscience. It sources 
its strength out of an origin hard to find and impossible to date. 
The problem in these approaches is that their modernized 
philosophy of history is hovering above artistic practices, not 
giving them any real epistemological agency that could touch 
the theory; today, philosophy does not have the job of saying 
what mute art cannot say (or “carry”), but to translate  
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epistemologically, what it is. “The question then becomes not 
one of ‘periodizing’ contemporaneity, or of erecting a neat 
white picket fence around it; rather, it becomes one of finding 
shortcuts, trapdoors, antechambers, and secret passages 
between now and elsewhere.”156
 This possibility of a new beginning on secular grounds 
might also be an overlooked theme in Benjamin, in spite of  
his “profane illumination.” But there are also many art 
nouveau-formulations in Benjamin that claim to “renew the 
old world,” or the “renewal of existence” or talk about 
“procedures of renewal.”157 So any time we have the project 
of “Die alte Welt erneuern,” this leads to the “Quell,”  
the source. Any time we indicate a contemporaneity, we 
indicate a contiguousness to the origins, we are doing an 
archaeology; without digging out origins (meaning ruptures  
and discontinuities), there would be no contemporaneity.  
Any time we feel contemporary to something, we dig out 
origins, we are doing and digging archaeology.
 When we deal with the “birth” of the contemporary 
moment — defining the contemporary as that which has begun 
but has not ended yet — we have to remind ourselves of  
the debate on the concept of beginnings.158 What are we talking 
about? Beginnings, origins, or births? About emergences or 
formations, and what is this “history of the contemporary” 
other than genealogy, Foucault’s Nietzschean “history of the 
present moment”? Is Foucault’s genealogy not declinating  
the archaeological theme oriented toward the contemporary, 
giving “rise to questions concerning our native lands”?159 
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 Foucault first differentiated between origins (Ursprung) 
and sources (Herkunft), asking why Nietzsche challenges the 
pursuit of the origin.160 He diagnosed two uses of the concept  
of origin in Nietzsche, one metaphysical, one anti-metaphysical, 
stating that the project of genealogical Nietzsche would have 
been a search for the anti-metaphysical beginnings and not 
for its metaphysical antithesis.161 Even if Foucault might have 
confused the conceptions of origin and beginning, and had 
forgotten Nietzsche’s theme of forgetting,162 one might wonder 
how these conceptions align with Benjamin’s and Agamben’s 
differentiation of a historical and an anti-historical beginning,  
of the differentiation between originating and the originated.  
At first sight, it seems as if we are dealing with Nietzsche’s two 
uses of origin, one metaphysical and one anti-metaphysical; that 
the anti-metaphysical use of origin would be synonymous with 
the originated, whereas the metaphysical use of origin would 
thus be synonymous with the originating; and that Foucault 
and Agamben would thus vote for two different versions of the 
origin. But does not Agamben’s and Benjamin’s advocation for 
the originating end up in exactly the metaphysical conception 
of origin Foucault was attacking with his genealogical method? 
Is Agamben able to give the conception of origin a contempo-
rary twist, because his origin is as metaphysical as the entire 
discourse on the contemporary? And what does this suspicion 
have to do with the neighbouring suspicion of the metaphysical 
roots of the discourse on the contemporary?
 
 The Presence of Ontology
But what does it mean to accuse Agamben (and maybe  
even Benjamin along with him) of a “metaphysical,” yet 
“ontological” discourse? And what does it mean to align the 
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contemporary with this suspicion — which paradoxically turns 
the leading signs before a discourse into its opposite, which 
seemed so anti-metaphysical at first and turns out to be quite 
ontological? But does “anti-historical” always imply metaphys-
ical or ontological? These are fundamental, and very severe 
questions. Of course, the archaeological discourse on contem-
poraneity means to do just that: to develop an anti-historical 
discourse on the contemporary that is neither metaphysical  
nor ontological. 
 At this moment, we can put the different parts of 
the archaeological agenda together. An archaeology of 
contemporaneity searches for the beginnings of active and 
effective moments — often concealed situations that are defined 
by the fact that they have not ended yet, as we find them 
in traumas or dreams as their constituting a priori. But we 
should not think this a priori as a transcendental, yet historical 
category, which gives us something like Foucault’s “historical 
a priori,” which is a paradoxical yet important figure for the 
contemporary. Even if one thinks Agamben’s historical case 
studies as relying on this “historical a priori” — as the search 
of something which has once begun in historical time and is 
still defining our contemporaneity — one can fear that in his 
transcendental archaeology, all materiality gets lost, under the 
aggressive and maybe avantgardistic commitment to what I 
have called the tradition of Wild Archaeologies.163 Even writing 
in the name of archaeology, Agamben misses any primary 
materiality: there are no conflicts between paper and stone, 
reading and seeing, texts and techniques. One could fear that 
archaeology, in his transcendental manœuvre, gets completely 
absorbed by philosophy.
 Or is the manœuvre that we are talking about here, not 
a transcendental but an ontological one? For there is a second 
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quality of the contemporary that Agamben brings up. His  
origin “is contemporary” with something else. So the contem-
porary is, quite simply. It is, as we said before, it is active and 
effective, which is why we should wonder what differentiates 
the activity and effectiveness Agamben talks about from plain 
ontological being? Also, the undefinable contemporary art 
seems less a quality of an object, but a temporal state, a being, 
that sets it apart from anything else. That is why one could call 
it an ecstacy: an ecstacy is (why Heidegger obviously also liked 
the term);164 it is ongoing, it is in operation, active, it consumes 
you. Anytime we think, “This is so contemporary!” (which 
might not happen so often), we are activated by something 
contagious, we are transgressing all judgment and experiencing 
a little ecstacy. The active ingredient of the contemporary in 
art is neither in the subject nor in the object; it indicates all  
but in a flat simultaneity, the presence of something still active, 
happening in the moment, that we cannot escape, and are 
within.
 The Spatiality of Contemporaneity
But if the contemporary in art happens to be neither in the 
subject nor in the object, then where is it? Maybe in its materi-
ality. An often heard accusation tells us that materiality —  
which might be held as carrier for the contemporary — is a 
code word for ontology: for the material must be activated by 
something to convey something. What here sounds quite vague 
is exactly “what meaning cannot convey,” which is the subtitle 
of Gumbrecht’s book on the Production of Presence —  
and which was summarized by architect Peter Zumthor by 
bringing up “this presence thing of not meaning but being.”165 
Gumbrecht operates a simple reversal: his “spatial concept  
of presence”166 proposes to access the primary materiality of 
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any contemporaneity by simply understanding presence not 
temporally, but spatially: 
The word ‘presence’ does not refer to a temporal but  
to a spatial relationship to the world and its objects. 
Something that is ‘present’ is supposed to be tangible for 
human hands.167 
First and above all, he [the author] wanted to understand 
the word ‘presence’ in this context as a spatial reference. 
What is ‘present’ to us, is in reach, in front of us, tangible 
for our bodies.168
 
Put more clearly, Gumbrecht’s definition of presence follows 
several shifts that this text has already untertaken with refer-
ence to various authors. To summarize, it first shifts the defi-
nition of the contemporary away from its novelty to its origin; 
secondly, it defines the origin not as old, but as potentially 
current; thirdly, it shifts the definition of the contemporary from 
the subject/object dichotomy to a more material understanding 
of presence; fourthly, it decentralizes the understanding of 
contemporaneity from the mental I think to the more material 
there is contemporaneity; and finally, fifthly, it shifts the  
definition of presence from a mental to a spatial paradigm.
 Understanding presence more spatially, we see that 
the materiality of contemporaneity simply lies in that which is 
present to us — not mentally present, but materially, “in front 
of us, tangible for our bodies.” Even though this shift from 
the mental to the material seems to be the easiest and most 
evident, it is nevertheless great, fundamental, epochal. For one 
has to keep in mind that presence for most people immediately 
implies the mental  presence of other people, minds, brains,  
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and not, or not at first, the material presence of things,  
objects, nature. We all too quickly forget about the material 
presence of the world, and we forget the primary or archaic 
nature of the “world” while talking about it.
 But there seems to be also a primary materiality of that 
which is contemporary, as things and objects are not simply 
there, they are there in presence, in a contemporary moment, 
they are contemporaries with us — and not only we with  
them! It is almost as if the contemporary was the “medium” 
needed to convey that things are actually there, which we  
all too quickly forget, because they stay and remain in most 
cases present to us, meaning contemporary. Therefore  
the “medium” and the “mediality” of the contemporary are  
that which tell us, that things are, in the present moment —  
which is also why the “mediality” of the contemporary seems 
quite transparent and invisible to us. We look right through  
it. We see things that are contemporary to us, but — as if  
their contemporaneity was built into them — we do not see 
their presence, their contemporaneity. Contemporaneity  
is the sine qua non for the perception of any object, for if they 
were not contemporary to us, if they were not present to us,  
if they were not our contemporaries, we would not perceive 
them at all.
 But are we not talking here quite obviously about being? 
Does not the contemporary simply rely on the very simple 
fact that things, that humans, that we all… are? Moreover is 
the impression of the transparency of contemporaneity not 
identical with the famous withdrawal of being from that which 
has being? Is the concealedness of the contemporary — the 
simple fact that we cannot see it as such — not the famous 
secrecy of being? Do we not, when we experience things in 
front of us, simply forget that they are there, together with 
us, contemporarily? And is the famous “double movement 
of unconcealing and hiding”169 not what we encounter when 
 169. Ibid., 67. i
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we try to talk about the contemporary: that it is everywhere 
(revealed) and nowhere (unrevealed) at the same time?  
One could end up with the impression that the entire discourse 
on contemporaneity is not only heavily impregnated, but maybe 
almost identical with a new ontological thinking, that we see 
also in other domains. 
 No matter how one answers this suspicion, it does not 
seem to be a matter of yes or no, or of the acceptance or 
refusal of a given hypothesis. Much more important than any 
suspicion is the fact that we can use ontological thinking to  
shift attention away from the question of mental contempora-
neity to a more spatial, corporal, and material dimension: 
Being, as it is being unconcealed, for example, in a work 
of art, is not something spiritual or something conceptual. 
Being is not a meaning, being belongs to the dimension  
of things. This is why Heidegger can say about the 
happening of truth in works of art: ‘Artworks universally 
display a thingly character, albeit in a wholly distinct 
way.’170
 
If the “thingly character” is best displayed by artworks, and 
if artworks define presence and contemporaneity not only 
mentally and temporally, but also materially and spatially, it is 
Heidegger’s temple that is, paradoxically, the contemporary 
artwork par excellence — because it is not contemporary for its 
novelty, but for its material and spatial presence. Ironically, one 
of the best descriptions of contemporaneity is the most untimely 
one — Heidegger’s description of the Greek temple. What is 
described in his famous descriptions of the Greek temple is 
nothing else but the contemporary moment of perception, the 
now of its thingly presence. The temple is as present as we  
are able to perceive it in the present moment, it is present now, 
in front of our eyes. As we are touched by artworks always 
 170. Ibid., 68.i 7  
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in a specific moment in time, in a certain presence, one might 
as well flip the coin around and say: True contemporaneity 
consists in the momentary perception of an artwork, no matter 
the epoch to which it belongs. The most contemporary work  
of art would thus be the temple, because it imposes its untimely 
presence upon us, no matter how uncontemporary and old  
it actually is.171 Eventually one could go on with this “presentifi-
cation,”172 saying that the material or thingly presence of  
one’s own body is “in sync with the things of the world.”173 
There are very simple material and maybe corporal and even 
medial conditions for the mental production of contemporaneity 
and even for the discourse on contemporaneity: conditions  
that inform our minds and our discourses, but that got lost  
in their own unfolding; conditions that are or were present  
at a time, that followed the structure of being, for they hid  
and concealed themselves in the process of their own  
unfolding.
 Saving Contemporaneity
In addition, Agamben, who does not cite Heidegger, finds  
his “original approach to the present,” in suspension before  
all cultural oppositions and decisions in ontological and  
psychoanalytical terms. It is not surprising that in his archae-
ological methodology — which is also a methodology of the 
contemporary — he does not make reference to the genealog-
ical Foucault, fighting all origins, but to the phenomenological 
one, in particular to Foucault’s preface to the 1930 psycho- 
ontological Dream and Existence by Ludwig Binswanger.174 
This is the very text in which Foucault, according to Agamben, 
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“precisely described — or foresaw — the strategies and 
gestures of archaeology.”175 It is in this text that Agamben 
finds an archaeology — of contemporaneity — that is “capable 
of going back, regressively, to the source of the split between 
consciousand unconscious,”176 “beyond memory and forget-
ting, or, rather, at the threshold of their indifference.”177  
We thus see how crucial the definition of the contemporary is  
for Agamben. He needs the contemporary for it indicates the 
presence of origins that could not be called present without 
this atemporal, asynchronic, and anachronic definition of the 
contemporary. If his contemporaneity was not constructed as 
heterogenous and hybrid, if the “facies” did not include all of 
the formation history of a stone, he could not integrate the  
past into the present as he does. 
 But how are we to reach this — not necessarily —  
long past age of constituting time, when the contemporary 
moment was constituted, as the contemporary always 
already operates in a constituted time? How are we to 
remember the times when we did not know what time (and 
thus the contemporary) originally was? How can we see the 
“facies” of the Greek temple without looking right through 
it? To get back to the dawn of constituting time and to the 
constitution of contemporaneity, Agamben proposes “a kind 
of archaeological époché,”178 that cites Husserl’s famous 
concept of phenomenological époché — that also tried to 
reveal in the world its conditioning structures that are normally 
concealed. But as Husserl’s phenomenological époché tried 
to save the original phenomenon from logic, Agamben’s 
archaeological époché saves the contemporary phenomenon 
from its burial in history. Agamben — like Kant and Benjamin 
before him — wants to save the transcendental quality of the 
contemporary, its transgression of the vulgar understanding 
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of the present moment. This is why he describes archaeology 
as the “immanent a priori of historiography.”179 Archaeology 
saves the singularity180 of any true contemporaneity from 
its burial by historical time, from its drowning in time. Only 
archaeology can do that, only archaeology “is capable to give 
the historical phenomenon its intelligibility.” Moreover that  
is why Agamben can finally in a very solemn statement tell  
us that, “the gesture of the archaeologist constitutes the 
paradigm of any true human action.”181
 This (also very Benjaminian) attempt to link the contem-
porary moment to its origins and to save the contemporaneity 
of the origin are evidently Agamben’s most vital examples, 
already cited as the embryonic tissue living on in the “mature 
organism” as well as “the child living on in the psychic life  
of the adult.”182 An origin, for Agamben, is present, because 
it keeps on being contemporary with the historical becoming 
of any being, whether it is the being of an embryo or the being 
of a codification that also stays with anything coded as long 
as it operates.183 But one could also give the — even more 
simple — example of everyone’s birthday, which makes this 
chiasm between origin and contemporaneity clear. Is a birthday 
something original, celebrating the origin, or is it contemporary, 
celebrating the ongoing contemporaneity of the origin? It is  
of course both, it is celebrating the becoming of the origin —  
of an origin, that never runs out of effectiveness.
 These most vital examples make clear that it is this active, 
driving force behind the newness that Agamben calls origin: 
an origin is coding time anew. This is why it does not have to 
only lie in the past but can also lie in the present. An origin can 
break into our time at any time, it can happen any minute, like 
a religious revelation or like a new love. Here lies the closeness 
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of this idea of an altered temporality, of an other  temporality, 
to messianic thinking, that also departs from the idea that 
something “totally new” can happen at any time and is able to 
break up our temporality completely. 
 But the impression that something “totally new” is 
beginning, can be also brought about by more “secular” 
events like the arrival of a child (which is, as a matter of fact, 
the fact of Christianity’s temporality), a memory (Proust) or 
simply with the arrival of a new love. If you ever wondered 
how strange it is, that, while you fall in love, everything for you 
changes while everything around you stays the same — how 
it is possible that you live in a totally new temporality while 
the time around you simply does not recognize it — then you 
need (and might have understood) Agamben’s origin, which 
designates something as “deep time.”184
 Becoming Contemporary
Nevertheless Agamben’s origin as “deep presence” is not  
the only one. It inscribes itself into a long discursive history  
of alternative temporal concepts that experimented well  
before Agamben with layered temporalities and “deep times.” 
For instance, the ongoing activity of an origin can be induced 
by dreams (Freud) or by new readings of history (Benjamin), 
by discourses (Foucault) or by new technical codifications 
(Kittler). These are all examples of paradoxical origins, 
paradoxical temporalities, because they indicate something 
like unpast pasts, pasts that do not pass away, pasts that 
simply refuse to fade into inactivity. On the contrary, an origin 
keeps on being present, being contemporary, it keeps on 
operating in the present and connects it to the past — and the 
contemporary is only truly contemporary if it welcomes and 
truly integrates the past. This is why the contemporary can be 
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defined as an “active force” that “continues to send towards 
us its fossil radiation.”185 
 But how does one truly integrate and welcome the  
past in its unfinishedness — especially if it is a painful one? 
The best example of such an unpast past, that is paradoxically 
contemporary to its origin, is the example of trauma.186  
The paradoxical temporality of contemporaneity is best exem-
plified by the example of trauma: past, but always recurring; 
always recurring and present, but never really graspable; 
present by its absence and absent by its forceful activity. 
Trauma is a paradoxical temporality, which is always contem-
porary for someone, always exercizes effects on someone’s 
psyche, no matter how long ago it has passed which can  
be quite confusing. When talking to a traumatized person,  
they talk about something so contemporary for them and  
their psyche even when referring to an event a long time ago.  
It is a temporality where there is no “ago,” no past, but a 
present, contemporary moment that just will not go away,  
a wound that does not heal — contrary to the popular saying 
that tells us that time heals all wounds. The contemporaneity 
of trauma has nothing to do with the question of how long it 
is past; something can indeed be very long ago and be very 
contemporary at the same time. No matter how long ago an 
experience has passed, it is always present in the traumatized 
person. So here we have this paradoxical temporality in its 
purest form: to be old and contemporary at the same time;  
to be past but always …present;” to be very far and very close 
at the same time.
 One famous example of an unpast past and the contem-
poraneity of trauma is Alain Resnais’ 1959 “documentary” 
movie Hiroshima Mon Amour, whose main character is a 
traumatized woman who lives in the past and in the present 
at the same time — or rather who does not live the present 
 185. Agamben, “Philosophical Archaeology,” 110.
 186. See Mark Jarzombek, in Presence, 81 on the presence of trauma.
 . , il i l 
Archaeology,” 110.
 186. See Mark Jarzombek, in 
Pres nce, 81 on the presence of trauma.
87
for her past trauma is still too contemporary and painful to 
her to arrive in and actually accept the present. The film, best 
deciphered by Kaja Silverman,187 illustrates not only the birth, 
the origin of a new era, of a postwar global situation, defined 
by the consciousness of a possible auto-destruction.188 It also 
illustrates the ambivalent temporality of a woman who displays 
this paradoxical contemporaneity through a montage of past 
situations and flashbacks into the present moment in which the 
movie plays. Maybe the movie is that hybrid contemporaneity, 
for its montage represents a perfect suturation between past 
and present, the concealed origins and the phantasmal contem-
poraneity. Constantly, the film flashes back to the origins of 
her trauma that make her numb to any present, thus displaying 
what Freud depicted as Urszene: an effective present that just 
does not go away, like a ban that is always active and just does 
not fade. As she just does not get over this episode of her life, 
the past does not go away from her, because of her unlived 
tragedy with a German soldier that keeps on living within her, 
not losing its contemporaneity no matter how long this story 
is past. What does this strange coalition between past trauma 
and contemporary absence signify? “They imply above all  
that not only memory, as in Bergson, but also forgetfulness, 
are contemporaneous with perception and the present. [...]  
Every presence thus contains a part of non-lived experi-
ence.”189
 What are we doing with the forgotten and non-lived 
parts of our lives that have not become biography and reality? 
That have not become contemporary? How long will this 
poor woman — and we of course all are this poor obsessed 
woman — be trapped in her own past? As we know, it is 
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only through the intermediate and caring force of her Japa-
nese lover that she gets access to any present. “Only at this 
point,”190 Agamben writes (and we can take his text to deci-
pher the film), “is the unlived past revealed for what it was: 
contemporary with the present. It thus becomes accessible 
for the first time, exhibiting itself as a ‘source.’”191 This is 
why through this film, we are witnessing a miracle: someone 
accesses her own presence “for the first time,” someone is 
becoming contemporary with herself by breaking the bound-
aries of a traumatic past. “For this reason, contemporaneity, 
co-presence to one’s own present… is rare and difficult; for  
this reason, archaeology, going back to this side of memory  
and forgetting, constitutes the only path of access to the  
present.”192
 The Materiality of Contemporaneity
Maybe, one should not ask What is the Contemporary? but 
rather how one becomes contemporary — thinking of that 
brave woman struggling for contemporaneity, the Joan of Arc 
of memory culture. But how does one struggle, how is the 
past, unpast or not, integrated into the present, into contem-
poraneity? How do we become contemporary to ourselves 
and to our own present? Of, course, one can state along with 
Schwarte, that it is the “function of contemporary art, to claim 
the unfinishedness of the past and the insurmountability of the 
contemporary.”193 Resnais’s film does just that: it not only 
“claims the unfinishedness of the past and the insurmountability 
of the contemporary,” it shows it, materializes and manifests  
it, which is much better. It has a very different way of 
displaying paradoxical temporalities than just developing new 
concepts of origin as Benjamin and Agamben have done. 
Hiroshima Mon Amour proceeds by montage, and it mounts 
 190. Ibid., 103.
 191. Ibid.
 192..Ibid.
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different temporalities next to each other. So did Lessing’s 
Laokoon, that also suggested to have a spatial understanding 
of the contemporaneity of an artwork in his notion of spatial 
arts — and so did Gumbrecht, when he simply shifted the 
understanding of the notion of presence from a temporal to 
a mere spatial register. Thus what is contemporary can also 
be what is spatially present, in reach, at hand, and — to have 
a more integrative and “deep” understanding of the “flat” 
contemporary — we can integrate the past into the present by 
providing space for it: in graveyards, museums and collections 
(for many people, I realize, museums are graveyards).
 Derrida, who also worked, like Agamben, on the notion 
of arché, has reminded us that the term arché comprises a 
temporal as well as a spatial definition.194 It not only designates 
the commandment, but also the commencement — there, 
where things begin. The arché symbolizes not only an order, 
but also the place where this order is instituted and installed. 
It thus integrates a place and a site, with all its materiality 
(beautifully displayed in Derrida’s maybe most material book 
on the archive).195 If the origin, the arché, designates not only 
a temporal order but also the place, site and materiality of this 
order, also the order of the contemporary, being part of the 
origin, comprehends place, site and materiality. So what could 
be a more material conception of contemporaneity? 
 We are touching, literally, on a second paradox of the 
concept of contemporaneity (the first one being the simulta-
neity of origin and contemporaneity, of the old and the new). 
Contemporaneity, which seems to be a temporal term, cannot 
be seized in time itself, it needs a space to become tangible. 
Contemporaneity cannot only be experienced mentally,  
it can be touched materially. There is not only a temporality  
of contemporality, but there is also a materiality of contempora-
neity. So if we really want to find out what is or was  
 194. Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 9ff.
 195. Ibid.
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contemporary at a certain time, we urgently need to switch 
from the transcendental model of historical time, that Osborne 
is putting forward, to the layers or strata of time — to the 
methodologies and epistemologies developed by Freud, 
Benjamin and Foucault, who all developed models of material 
time, of strata and fields.196
 Layers of Time
Indeed, the conception of the layer is a good example for a 
more material conception of contemporaneity — for things or 
items lying in the same layer are (more or less) contemporary 
to one another, they are material comrades of time. Every 
geologist knows that one and the same layer can contain a 
multitude of temporalities; we here find the famous heteroge-
neity of contemporaneity, the coming together of different times 
in a single unity, in the layer — which is not a unity. Therefore, 
the materiality of the layer is deconstructing Osborne’s root 
idea of the contemporary [...]: “a coming together of different 
but equally ‘present’ times, a temporal unity in disjunction,  
or a disjunctive unity of present times.”197 The materiality  
of the layer claims first that “present’s disjunctive unity” is not 
in time, but in space. The debris of the dinner party extends 
on the space of a table as well as the debris of a farmhouse 
excavation unfolds in layers of earth. 
 Secondly, the extension of the layer shows us that 
contemporaneity is not only fictional as in Osborne,198 but also 
material. The layer shows empirically, that there actually have 
been past contemporaneities. Therefore, archaeology does  
not work with time as such, not with transcendental time, 
neither does it develop immaterial concepts of time. Time in 
the layer is not just in our minds, but right here, manifest in 
 196. Ibid.
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our hands, time gets tangible, materialized in sites or deposits, 
remnants, debris, and remains. Weinberger holds his family 
history — which is not a history anymore — in his hands and 
shows it (in a quite spectacular way) to the spectators. In 
any case, farmhouse or dinner table, there are, ontologically, 
spaces and sites of time, which is something we first have to 
understand, in a quite Heideggerian way, before we start to 
think and synthesize time in the first place.
 Therefore, the layer (or strata or deposit or couche) is an 
alternative concept of time, of contemporary time — a material 
contemporaneity or a contemporaneity of materiality. Also, 
looking at strata is the oldest and simplest technique of telling 
what was contemporary to what: geologists in the eighteenth 
century began to know about synchronicities by analysing 
strata. If God was not the ever contemporary anymore and 
was not responsible for objects’ ages, it was the analysis of the 
earth and its layers. If something was found in the same layer 
as something else, these things were contemporary. Layers 
are spaces of contemporaneity, sites of co-presence, maybe 
even an archive of contemporaneity. This is also why the 
temporality of the layer is defined by a certain immanence and 
contingency — one might also say, by a certain within-ness. 
When we defined contemporaneity’s temporality above as 
that which has begun, but not ended yet, one might also say 
that contemporaneity is defined as that which is within. We 
are within a certain temporality, we operate within a certain 
computer codification or within a religious belief or we are 
acting within an active love. This within-ness of the contempo-
rary, this immanence and contingency — that obviously avoids 
calling it simply being — can be addressed materially by a 
conception of the layer. The conception of the layer as a mate-
rial alternative to the concept of being indicates also that there 
are not only sites and institutions of the contemporary, but that 
they have a certain extent and dimensionality existing in space, 
that there is also a materiality of the contemporary.
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 But not only geologists, also archaeologists use the layer 
to state what was contemporary of what; they spend consider-
able time trying to measure (by all sorts of fancy techniques) 
to discern what was how old and what was contemporary with 
what. Using the model of the strata rather than, say, the time 
bar, one does not only assemble what once was co-present at 
a certain time, con-temporary (gleich-zeitig) — which is always 
an idealization or temporalisation, as Osborne would say —  
one also gets something more material. Archaeologists simply 
reconstruct societies through their remnants and leftovers,  
like today’s garbage archaeology reconstructs contempo-
rary societies through their leftovers. Like the archaeological 
leftover searchers after the party, the archaeologist of the 
contemporary gets an entirely different image of the past  
than any historical account would give him. The garbage and 
leftovers show what really happened and what the chroniclers 
of it maybe already forgot or wanted to forget or repress  
— a differentiation between wishful thinking versus the real.
 The key difference lies in the fact that archaeology works 
with deposits, findings and records rather than with sources. 
An archaeological record (in a layer, for example) shows 
instead of telling or narrating something; it shows simply, not 
symbolically encoded, a layer of (maybe) equally unimportant 
facts about which people might not even want to be informed. 
This record appears in a three dimensional medium that is very 
different from the symbolic medium of writing and scripture, 
in which historical documents exist. It shows something visible 
about contemporaneity instead of something readable, and 
thereby executes a totally different regime of practices and 
knowledge with it. 
 In the archaeological regime of visibility, there are only 
traces that you can preserve — traces of last night’s party,  
for example — traces that we simply have to see. The archae-
ologist of the contemporary must not look away from the ugly 
dirt and the rubble and immediately listen to the conveniently 
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clean history of the party. Instead one has to open one’s eyes, 
starting out from the dirt and avoiding cleaning the table —  
to forensically understand that the ugly dirt is all that remains 
from the past, all the evidence one possesses. The archaeolo-
gist has to secure all traces of everything on that table, taking 
it as a layer to reconstruct the events of a maybe unforgettable 
and yet forgotten evening. This dirty action of securing time 
past is opposed to history’s clean selection of what people 
thought to be important, contemporary and visible.
 This material concept of the layer was adopted in the 
Humanities, as we know, from Freud’s layers of the uncon-
scious to Foucault’s episteme and from Benjamin to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s Mille Plateaux. Their concept of “stratigraphic 
time” was recently brought up by John Rajchman relating  
to the discourse on contemporaneity,199 who reminded us  
of its closeness to artistic techniques such as montage, which 
also worked with the collision of heterogenous temporalities. 
Rajchman also develops a model of different strata in  
the history of contemporary art, which would be named  
by the layers 1945, 1968, 1989, the latter being the moment 
of “world history” or “global history,” which is the history 
of contemporary art, setting itself apart from modernist and 
avant-gardeistic art — a concept that still sounds too historical  
to me. Less historical is of course Didi-Huberman, when he 
called Duchamp’s readymades contemporary with prehistorical 
burial objects, because there would also be “curiosity” paired 
with “magic”200 — which is equivalent to stating that the  
readymade and the prehistorical burial object reside within  
the same temporal layer.
 But if there is a materiality of the contemporary in the 
layer, there must also be concrete sites of the contemporary 
within history and within historical time. Even though we all  
too quickly utter the answer — institutions for contemporary 
 199. Rajchman, “The Contemporary: A new Idea?,” 125–144.
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art as sites of the contemporary — we should also include 
museums, collections and even graveyards as institutions of 
the contemporary for they negotiate incessantly claims of the 
present with claims of the past (when, for example, parts of 
graveyards are cleared of old graves to create space for new 
ones and contemporary dead corpses). In addition, parliaments 
or courts negotiate past laws and orders in the light of the 
contemporary and should therefore be understood as institu-
tions of the contemporary.201
 A third prominent example of the material temporality 
of the layer, after leftovers and art history (after Duchamp), 
is the temporality of fashion — an example also taken up by 
Agamben (after Benjamin), probably for the simple reason 
that it demonstrates quite well the advantage of conceptualizing 
temporality as a material layer over thinking it as chrono-
logical history.202 The biggest mystery of fashion stems from 
the impression that you cannot explain where it comes from, 
that you cannot deduce new trends from a causal model. You 
never know where the “new” comes from, whether it is born 
on the street or in the studios, whether it is in the past or in 
present — and one can never reduce it to one of these factors. 
All you know is that it is all of these factors at the same time. 
Everything is reacting to everything — a model that has more 
to do with quantum physics than with causal thinking — or 
with the model of the layer, because all you can say is that all 
these factors once co-existed in the same contemporary layer 
of time, and they all reacted on one another without causality 
or linearity. True, the layer or strata as a material model of 
contemporaneity can tell us about reactions without linearity 
and contacts without causalities — contacts which happen  
“on the street” all the time. These contacts without causalities 
demonstrate that fashion is not happening in history books,  
 201. Gumbrecht, Production of Presence, 85. 
 202. Gumbrecht, Production of Presence, 85. 
 201. Gumbrecht, Production of 
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but in three-dimensional space, in a space or site of contempo-
raneity — and maybe this is an archive of contemporaneity that 
one can work with differently than with linear history. 
 The Traces of Contemporaneity
The traces of the contemporary (be it as simple as leftovers) 
can only be secured through visual, material, or archaeological 
operations, not through historical ones — and I think that herein 
lies the great attraction for visual artists to work with material 
and visual remnants of the present.203 The traces they work 
with do not only reflect the present or the past, they materi-
alize the contemporary and temporalize the material inversely 
(which is why this project of temporalizing the artistic material 
is complementary to the archaeological task of materializing  
the historical). As archaeology is operating in space instead  
of time, it is able to grasp the time past (like Proust tried to), 
to literally touch time; and through touching le temps perdu,  
it renders our own situation of contemporaneity tangible.
 The arts can do the very same thing, which is what we 
need contemporary art for or the contemporary in art: to 
render our time and contemporaneity sensible for us — a pres-
ence in time that only the visual arts can show us by securing 
its traces. The material world is most akin to Boris Groys’ 
“comrades of time,” its traces are the true comrades of time. 
It is not the subjects, not the human agents and witnesses, not 
even Groys’ time-based art “that can help time, to collaborate, 
become a comrade of time,”204 but the material witnesses  
and agencies, that are most truthful to past contemporaneities: 
that is the contemporaneity of the past. The contemporary 
can only be touched materially, not historically, or mentally. 
This is why we need material witnesses of time past and this 
is why we need art, contemporary or not. For in the end, the 
material witness can surprise us, it can unearth unexpected 
 203. Gumbrecht, Production of Presence, 85. 
 204. Groys, “Comrades of Time.” Presence, 107f.
 204. Groys, “Comrades of Time.”
96
material — which is why we must not only with Nietzsche love 
the “ignorance of the future,”205 but which is also why we can 
say with Raqs Media Collective that “a contemporaneity that 
is not curious about how it might be surprised is not worth our 
time.”206
 205. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix 
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In this sense, MTDBT2F is not only a tool to generate countless 
PostScript fonts, but *at least equally* a tool to think about and around 
MetaFont. Mathematician Douglas Hofstadter once noted that one of 
the best things MetaFont might do is inspire readers to chase after 
the intelligence of an alphabet, and “yield new insights into the elusive 
‘spirits’ that flit about so tantalizingly behind those lovely shapes we  
call ‘letters.’”
For instance, each volume in The Contemporary Condition is set in a 
new MTDBT2F, generated at the time of publication, which is to say 
*now.*
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